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The financial difficulties encountered by cities during the recent
recession and the fiscal crisis which continues to beset New York
City have generated widespread interest in the causes of municipal
financial distress. For many years, the cities' fiscal capacities to provide
basic services were taken wholly for granted. While city residents may
have been dissatisfied with the levels of their tax bills, most cities were
able to finance virtually all of their services from their own revenues,
and there was little opposition to the growth in quantity and quality of
urban services. More recently, this situation has changed radically. The
expansion of services has combined with escalating costs, increasing
resistance to tax increases, and drastic changes in urban population
patterns to jeopardize the provision of basic municipal services in some
major cities. The specter of cut-backs or actual stoppages in education,
garbage collection or police and fire protection has struck citizens at
their doorsteps and has focused intense scrutiny on the fiscal strength of
cities throughout the country.
Historically, investigations of financial distress have looked primarily at the determinants of municipal expenditures and the availability of
resources to meet these expenditures. In recent years, the cities' increast Copyright @ 1977 by Colin C. Blaydon and Steven R. Gilford.
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ing difficulties in maintaining service levels with their own resources
have generated increased interest in two other components of the municipal financial picture-debt financing and state and federal cost-sharing
programs. Debt financing'is commonly used by many cities to balance
short-term seasonal mismatches between revenues and expenditures
and to finance long-term capital investments. Because of its central role
in the New York City crisis, debt policy has received much more
attention in recent discussions of municipal finance. Substantial interest
has also been directed toward the role of state and federal grants-in-aid
as the cities have become increasingly dependent on these additional
sources of revenue.
The interrelationships of these four components of the cities' financial structure-expenditures, revenues generated by the cities themselves, debt financing, and intergovernmental cost sharing-necessarily
form the framework for any analysis of governmental finance. In the
sections that follow, we will examine the current financial picture for
twenty-nine of America's largest cities and outline the major issues of
financial policy which face these cities as they adapt to changes in the
patterns of urban growth.
I.

POPULATION TRENDS

The pattern of shifts in urban population is fundamental to the
current fiscal situation of the cities. Because of their limited geographic
boundaries and their dependence on property values and business conducted within those boundaries, the cities' financial positions are highly
vulnerable to changes in the patterns of urban migration. Each time a
business or family moves outside the city limits, it takes with it a piece of
the city's revenue base. The extent to which this loss of revenue is
important depends on whether or not there is sufficient immigration to
maintain commercial activity and the demand for land on which land
values depend.'
City population loss from emigration to the suburbs is not a new
phenomenon. Decentralization of population and businesses has been
taking place since at least the turn of the century.' While the cities
were young this did not create a financial problem, since people and jobs
and the revenue base they represented could normally be recaptured
through annexation. During the 1950s, the situation began to change
as many older cities began to face difficulties in expanding their bound1. See notes 121-26 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Peterson 73.
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aries.3 City expansion no longer encroached only on open farm land or
newly settled suburban development. The city boundaries were now
adjacent to older, established suburban communities (or in some cases
4
younger cities) which had their own identities and opposed annexation.
In some cases, expansion was impeded by state borders. 5 More recently,
resistance to annexation has been augmented by reaction to desegregation of central city schools.
For whatever reason, by the early 1950s annexation as an easy
solution was no longer available to most of the older cities.0 As a result,
the cities began to experience a modicum of fiscal strain. While urban
population remained fairly stable as immigrants replaced many of those
departing for the suburbsJ the cities experienced net revenue losses as
their more affluent residents left and were replaced by poorer migrants
from the South.8 The challenge for these cities was not so much to
reduce levels of municipal services, because such services were still
needed by the ever-growing metropolitan area at large. Rather, the
challenge was to find ways to expand the revenue base to the entire
region. To some extent, this has been achieved over the last decade by
greater reliance on new revenue sources and federal and state costsharing.'
In the 1970s, however, another trend appeared-the population
decline of entire metropolitan regions.' 0 This was the result of a
process that has been in existence for two decades, the migration of
whites from the North and Midwest to the South and West. This
decline had been obscured by the offsetting effects of black migration
from the rural South. But when that migration slowed, major metropolitan areas began to lose population."
3. See id. at 76 (Table 13).
4. See note 147 infra and accompanying text.
5. St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri, are leading examples. Since cities are
creatures of the state, a bi-state city is virtually impossible under our federal system of
government.
6. Since 1960, no city over ninety years old has been able to enlarge its geographical territory significantly by annexation. See Peterson 76 (Table 13). See also JEC
PINT 12 (Table 1). Age is defined as the number of years since the city reached a
population of 100,000. Peterson 77 (Table 13 note a).
7. But cf. Peterson 74 (Figure 2) (population density in aging cities has consistently declined since 1950).
8. See 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GRowTH AD DEVELOPMENT 24, 33-34.

9. The proportion of expenditures that is financed by state and local governments
from their own sources has fallen from 90 percent to 80 percent over the last two
decades. See Sunley, State and Local Government, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES:
THE NExT TEN YEARs 382 (Table 9-7) (H. Owen & C. Shultze ed. 1976).
10. See, e.g., 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELoPMENT 26-33.
11.

See id. at 24-25.

In the 1960s, net black immigration was 20.2 percent
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TABLE 1
Changes in Population 1970-1974
Change in
IChange in
Change in
Metropolitan
[Suburban
Central City
Population (%)a I Population (%)b Population (%)c

Declining Metropolitan Areas
A. With Declining Suburbs
New York City - 4.0
Los Angel es
- 4.0
Seattle
- 3.4
Pittsburgh
- 9.0
Buffalo
3.8
B. With Growing Suburbs
Cleveland
-13.0
St. Louis
-12.2
Cincinnati
5.4
Detroit
- 9.0
- 2.7
Chicago
Philadelph ia
- 5.8
- 4.0
Milwaukeee
Kansas Ciity, Mo. - 2.3
San Franc'isco
- 8.2
Indianapo lis
0
Boston
0
Memphis*
+ 4.7
II. Growing Metropolitan Areas
A. Declining Central Cities

Net
Metropolitan
Migration (%)d

I.

New Orleans
Baltimore
Atlanta
Denver

-

2.7
7.5
2.3
3.7

B. Growing Central Cities
Dallas
+ 1.2
Columbus
+ 5.6
Honolulu
+ 8.0
Jacksonville
+ 5.8
San Antoniot
+ 11.3
Houston
+ 4.5
San Diego
+ 14.5
Phoenix
+23.0

-

1.0
0
- 1.0
-.

-

1.2
1

+13.4
+11.9
+17.5

+24.0
+ 7.2
+ 4.0
+11.5
+26.3
+ 6.1
+22.5
+ 8.9
+17.7

5.0
4.7
4.4
3.7
3.1

+ 4.2
+ 3.3
+11.3
+12.2
+ 5.1

+ 4.8
+ 9.6
+ 8.5
+10.3
+11.2
+11.8
+20.9

+
+

.4
.8

+ 3.0
+ 4.4
+ 4.4

+ 5.6
+ 8.1
+16.1

* The unique character of Memphis is the result of several large annexations
during the period examined which brought an additional 136,562 residents into the
Memphis city limits. See JEC PRINT 12 n.7. See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
3OUNDARY AND ANNEXATION SURVEY 1970-1973, at 63 (1975).

An addition of this

population to the suburbs rather than the city would have left the city losing population
and the suburbs gaining it. This result is consistent with the other data presented in
the table.
t Population estimates for San Antonio are based on 1970 census figures. See
JEC PRINT 12 (Table 1).
SOURCES:
a Derived from SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1975 SURVEY OF BUYING POWER, Section
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The current situation is suggested by Table 1. During the early
seventies, over one-half of the twenty-nine largest
2 metropolitan areas in
the United States experienced net emigration.'

In other words, be-

tween 1970 and 1974, there were actually more people leaving these
metropolitan areas than moving into them. As might be expected, these
declining metropolitan areas are generally older and located in the

northern industrial tier. With the exception of Memphis, which was
able to expand through annexation during the period examined, 13 every

central city in a declining metropolitan area was also experiencing a loss
of central city population. 1 4 These cities were affected by two trends:

emigration from the central cities to their suburbs and migration between metropolitan areas.

A critical issue for the declining central city is whether it can
remain the center of a functional economic unit. Even where central
city growth has ended, it may be possible for a city to remain vital if it is
annually in the Northeast and 11.1 percent in the Midwest while net white emigration
was 1.3 percent and 2.6 percent respectively. Havemann, Stanfield & Peirce, Federal
Spending: The North's Loss Is the Sunbelt's Gain, 8 NAT'L J. 878, 888 (June 26,
1976). Since 1970, however, black immigration, to the Northeast has been less than
white emigration. 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 25. As a
result, for the first time since 1940, the Northeast is experiencing a net loss through
migration. Id.
12. Net migration is that part of the change in a city's population which is not
attributable to the natural population increase. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, Series P-25, No. 618 at 24
n.1 (January, 1976). It focuses on movements of people by removing from the calculation gains from births and losses due to deaths.
In the short run, net migration is the best indicator of population trends in a
metropolitan area. By netting out births and deaths, this statistic eliminates changes in
numbers of the very young and very old and reveals shifts in the work force more clearly
than do raw population statistics.
13. See note * to Table 1 supra.
14. Since birth rates normally exceed death rates, negative population trends are
generally indicative of net migration trends which are even more negative. Unfortunately, central city net migration statistics for the 1970s are not yet available.
D (1975)

(12/31/74 population estimates); SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1971 SURVEY
OF BUYING POWER, Section D (1971) (12/31/70 population estimates).
b Derived from SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1975 SURVEY OF BUYING POWER, Section
D (1975) (12/31/74 city population estimates); SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1971 SURvEY OF BUYING POWER, Section D (1971) (12/31/70 city population estimates); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:

POPULATION ESTIMATES AND

Series P-25, No. 618, Table 1 (January, 1976) ("Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan Areas, 1973 and 1974, and Components of Change since 1970")
(SMSA populations: 1970 census, 1974 (provisional)).
c. d Derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, Series P-25, No. 618, Table 1 (January,
1976) ("Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan Areas, 1973 and 1974, and Components of Change since 1970") (percent change in population and percent net migration 1970 to 1974).
PROJECTIONS,
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part of a broader metropolitan region which has the resources needed to
support services in the region. The key to the maintenance of the
metropolitan resource base is the suburbs. In such metropolitan areas
as New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, Pittsburgh and Buffalo, it may be
extremely difficult for the central cities to attract and develop the new
revenue sources needed to support present levels of services. The fiscal

situation is substantially more promising where the suburbs are growing.
As Table 1 indicates, overall emigration tends to be less severe in

metropolitan areas with growing suburbs. Even where suburban
growth is not as rapid as central city decline, it appears likely that land
values will remain more stable and that revenue sources will remain
more constant in the metropolitan area with growing suburbs. 5
In several declining central cities-New Orleans, Baltimore,
Atlanta and Denver-suburban growth is actually so great that the
metropolitan area is growing. If these cities could expand their boundaries or begin to attract would-be suburbanites into the central city,

the central city might actually be able to grow.'6
Only one-third of the central cities examined actually experienced

an absolute growth in population between 1970 and 1974. These
growing cities tend to be the centers of relatively young, rapidly growing
metropolitan areas. Central city growth has been generally limited to
the younger cities"7 of the South and Southwest 8 and has been largely
restricted to municipalities which had extensive geographic areas to

begin with' or have managed to annex adjacent territory.
15. See notes 121-26 infra and accompanying text.
16. The extent of Baltimore's central city population loss suggests that neither of
these alternatives may be available there. The suburban growth which Baltimore is
currently experiencing appears to be the result of the increasing dispersion of federal
government employees who work in or around Washington, D.C. It is unlikely that the
focus of these individuals' economic activity is Baltimore. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, Series P25, No. 618, at 6, 23 (January, 1976) (figures for Washington and Baltimore Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in Table 1).
17. Except for Memphis and Columbus (both seventy years old), which were able to
expand by annexation in the early 1970s, see JEC PImNT 12 (Table 1), every growing
central city listed in Table 1 of the text is less than fifty years old. See Peterson 76
(Table 13).
18. See Table I supra. See 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 29 (Figure 11-6).
19. Jacksonville, for example, grew in population even though it did not undertake
any annexations during this period. In 1970, however, it had the lowest population
density of any city in the country with population over 500,000-only 690 people per
square mile. The next lowest density in a city of comparable 'size was Kansas City,
Missouri, with 1,603 people per square mile. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1973, at 22-23 (Table 23).
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The capacity to annex has been critical to the continued growth
that characterizes our fiscally strong urban areas. Of the fourteen
cities with populations of 500,000 or more whose population consistently declined between 1960 and 1973, not a single one was able to annex

a significant populated area. 20 Yet during the same period, most of the
cities which continued to grow had at least one and often two annexa21

tions resulting in 10 to 20 percent gains in central city population.

Annexation has therefore accounted for almost all of the population
growth experienced by most growing central cities.
TABLE 2
Annexations in Growing Cities 1970-1973
Growing Central
Cities

Memphis

% Increase
in Territory
from
Annexation
1970-1973

% Increase
in Population
from
Annexation
1970-1973

Increase in Population due
to Annexation as a Percent
of Total Increase in Central
City Population, 1970-1973

19.9

21.9

390.0*

t
1.3
2.0
Dallas
263.0*
4.9
16.9
Columbus
Honolulu
Jacksonville
30.2
2.0
37.9
San Antonio
16.5
1.4
1.9
San Diego
**
**
14.9
Houston
129.0*
11.0
8.6
Phoenix
* Figures over 100 percent reflect the fact that major annexations were undertaken
during a period when population was otherwise ldeclining.
t Despite the annexation, Dallas lost population during this period.
No annexation.
** Data not available.
SOURCES: JEC PRINT 12 (Table 1); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BOUNDARY AND
ANNEXATION SURVEY 1970-1973, Table 2 (1975).

A fairly strong pattern thus emerges.

In all but a handful of

metropolitan areas, the suburbs have continued to grow. The majority
of central cities, however, are losing population from their core and are

unable to recapture this population because of barriers to annexation.
20. Compare Peterson 76 with JEC PRINT 12. There were only three annexations
by cities with declining populations during this period: Los Angeles added 10,293 and
Chicago added 4,737 to their populations of about 3 million. Dallas also annexed a 5.2
square mile area with a population of 11,336 to increase its population of 844,000 by 1.3
per cent. Id. See also P. PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF AMERICAN CrnES 176 (1976) (not
a single one of the twelve SMSAs which had a population of over 2 million in 1970 had
experienced an annexation by its central city in the previous ten years).
21. See JEC PRINT 12 (Table 1). See also Peterson 72: "As a group, the 13 cities
that gained population in the 1960s enlarged their' geographical area by 77 percent over
the decade as a result of annexation and consolidation."
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These population losses imply a variety of problems with regard to both
expenditure and revenue levels. In the next three sections, some of
these problems will be explored in an effort to outline the policy options
for the declining cities and the pitfalls which currently growing cities
should attempt to avoid.
II.

EXPENDITURES

During the past two decades, the public sector of our economy has
experienced tremendous growth. 2 As part of this expansion, municipal
expenditures have increased dramatically. While in fiscal 1963 American cities spent $17.8 billion,2" the cities expended over $60.4 billion in
fiscal 1975.24 In metropolitan areas of all sizes, per capita expenditures
for local services more than doubled between fiscal 1966 and fiscal
1973.25

This rapid growth in the local government sector can be attributed
to a variety of factors.26 Inflation and dramatic hikes in fuel and
construction costs have affected local governments just as they have
affected private citizens and businesses. Sophisticated new technologies
and the ever-increasing magnitude and complexity of providing local
government services have also increased personnel costs, as needs have
developed for more highly trained and specialized municipal employ7
ees.2
A third factor which has been generally assumed to have contributed to higher levels of municipal expenditures has been the availability of
state and federal cost-sharing programs. It has been estimated that
these programs induce additional city expenditures at a rate of about 40
percent for revenue-sharing funds and as high as 90 percent for categorical funds.28 The high concentration in the central cities of low-income
22. See, e.g., 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 44. Between
1954 and 1974, public expenditures nearly quintupled, increasing by 373.6 percent. The
share of the gross national product for which they accounted rose from 27.2 percent in
1954 to 35.6 percent in 1974. Public employment increased substantially during this
period; in the last 15 years, one out of every three new jobs has been in the public sector.
23. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1964-65, Table 1
(1966).
24. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CrIY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1974-75, Table 1
(1976).
25. See T. MULLER, GROWING AND DECLINING URBAN AREAS: A FISCAL COMPARISON
13 (rev. ed. 1976).
26. See generally 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH A

DEVELOPMENT 45-47.

27. See id. at 46.
28. Gramlich & Galper, State and Local Fiscal Behavior and Federal Grant Policy,
1973 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 15.
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groups who can benefit from categoric assistance 29 and other state and
federal programs is a significant force in the high expenditures of the
older declining cities.
The most important factor contributing to the growing costs of
municipal services has been the escalating cost of public sector labor.
The high labor-intensity of government services"0 makes the public
sector extremely vulnerable to inflationary pressures, and the recent
escalation of the cost of living has combined with the power of public
employee unions to make the increases in public sector labor costs
particularly dramatic. 3 1 Between 1970 and 1975 alone, average monthly wages (October payroll sample) for noninstructional municipal
32
workers increased by 42.6 percent.

The upward pressures on municipal expenditures have been particularly acute in the older cities with declining populations.3

3

Cities

facing declining populations spend more per capita, have more employees, and pay higher municipal wages than do cities with continued
growth.

In part, this problem comes from the lag effect which occurs

when the city adds or eliminates service personnel3 5 As a city grows,
its ability to provide services lags behind the demand for those services.

As a city matures, the number of service personnel per capita catches up
with the demand for services. And as city population and the demand
for services decline, the level of service personnel tends to remain at the
29. See Reischauer, The Federal Government's Role in Relieving Cities of the Fiscal
Burdens of Concentrations of Low-Income Persons, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 293, 295 (1976).
In one-third of the SMSAs where the central city population has declined consistently
between 1960 and 1973, over 15 percent of the central county population was receiving
welfare payments. See Peterson 76. While only small portions of welfare payments are
financed locally (the exceptions being New York City, San Francisco, Denver, Philadelphia and Baltimore, all of which have no overlying county government), Reischauer,
supra, at 300, these welfare recipients are also dependent on other state and local federal
programs to which local governments do contribute in varying degrees.
30. See 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTHi AND DEVELOPMENT 46: "70 to 80 per-

cent of the budget for a typical city goes for wages, salaries, and fringe benefits."
31. See Peterson 106-12.
32. During this same period, the average October earnings of full-time instructional
employees increased 31.7 percent. U.S. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, CITY EMPLOYMENT IN
1975, at 1 (1976).
33. For the most comprehensive and recent works discussing this phenomenon, see
T. MULLER, supra note 25, and Peterson (both authors are from the Urban Institute).
34. In 1973, for example, for cities with populations of more than 500,000, the seven
growing cities had only 58 percent of the per capita expenditure level of the fourteen
cities that had a long history of decline. In addition, the growing cities had only 68 percent of the work force of the declining cities and the median age of their populations was
only 85 percent of their declining counterparts. See Peterson 76-77.
35. See T. MULLER, supra note 25, at 42.
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level that had already been reached. However, some declining cities
have managed to pare down their work forces substantially. 6
Another factor contributing to higher expenditures in declining
cities is their older physical plants, which are even more labor-intensive
and require more maintenance than do those of the newer cities. But
perhaps the most fundamental reason is the nature of the population of
the older cities. There simply are more persons in those cities who
consume high levels of services without contributing much in the way of
income-more aged, more unemployable adults, more female-headed
37
households with small children.
All of these conditions help to account for the increased per capita
expenditures by the mature or declining cities, but they do little to
explain the higher wages of municipal employees in those cities. Two
factors appear to contribute to these higher wages: first, the fact that
mature and declining cities have higher costs of living and higher private
sector wages, and second, that employees in these cities frequently have
stronger unions which win more favorable contract settlements. In
addition, the higher wage costs are accompanied by much higher fringe
benefit costs, particularly pension costs.3 8 This is attributable both to
the higher municipal wages in these cities and to the delayed nature of
municipal pension costs. Since there is a natural lag in the pension
contribution for growing work forces, the younger and growing city will
have considerably lower pension costs than a city with an older work
force, more retirees, and an older pension plan.
Yet even these factors do not explain the very high pension benefit
levels enjoyed by municipal workers relative to workers in the private
sector. This is better explained by the unique features of retirement
benefits for policemen and firemen, 9 the traditional concept of a public
pension as compensation for a lower public wage, and the lack of
36. Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Memphis are the leading examples, each having cut
its city work force by about 10 percent between 1970 and 1974. See JEC PRTtr 23
(Table V).
37. See generally Reischauer, supra note 29.
38. While New York presents an extreme example, its high pension costs are
indicative of the magnitude of the problem. The cost of pension plans in private
industry is usually between 5 and 12 percent of payroll. The cost of New York City's
retirement plans is over 30 percent of payroll. Thomas, Analysis of Pension Costs for
Municipalities, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 234, 237 (1976).
39. In many cities, there has been a "longstanding practice of providing one-half of
pay pensions at very early ages to policemen and firemen who have rendered 20 to 25
years of service .

. . ."

Jump, Compensating City Government Employees: Pension

Benefit Objectives, Cost Measurement, and Financing, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 240, 248
(1976). The cost of some police and fire department pension plans is close to 50 percent of payroll. Id.
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budget discipline on negotiated pension settlements because the higher
costs are not felt immediately but come in later years.40
While choices about the quantity of services to be provided will be
important, some of the most basic decisions facing the cities in the next
few years will therefore involve service costs, which are largely independent of the level of services being provided. Since perhaps the most
significant of these decisions will involve the pension cost component of
wages, some of the questions which arise in connection with pension
plans require fuller discussion.
A.

Pension Issues

Some of the major issues with regard to public employee pensions
today are:
(1) Level of benefits relative to public employee wages and relative to
private sector benefits;
(2) Benefits for public safety officers, particularly the age at retirement and level of benefits relative to expected benefits earned from
second careers;
(3) Tying benefit payments to wage levels or cost of living factors;
(4) Funding of pension commitments: the extent to which a city sets
aside funds for future benefit payments as opposed to paying
these benefits out of current revenues;
(5) Whether cities should be allowed to borrow from their own employees' pension funds;
(6) The role of Social Security benefits and the financial pressures
caused by increasing payroll tax rates.'
The problem with benefit levels has arisen as a corollary to the
inflation of public employee wages. When these wages were well below
those of the private sector, pensions with high benefit levels were
considered to be only a fair reward for long service. 41 However, now
42
that public wages have more than caught up with private sector wages,
40. Given the deferred nature of the pension obligation, a jurisdiction may
avoid paying for some or even all of the accruing benefits until an employee
retires and becomes eligible to collect. When such practices are followed,
cost allocations are distorted over time as is the distribution of the cost burden among different generations of taxpayers. Moreover, the stage may be
set for sudden and catastrophic increases in current operating costs when the
workforce matures and large waves of employees reach retirement age. Id.
at 251.
41. See Sunley, supra note 9, at 391-92.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ADvisoRy COMMISSION
42. Peterson
see
(Table
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM:
TRENDS 61
SIGNIFICANT
FEATURES
XXIII) (1976). State and local employees now have annual earnings that are almost 4
percent
percent above the national average whereas eighteen years ago they were
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the accompanying benefit levels appear to be generally excessive and
particularly so for the older declining cities.43
However, changes in pension benefit levels relative to wages can

only occur over an extended period as future wage increases are negotiated. The policy choice that has the most immediate impact on the cash

flow commitments of cities is the basic decision about funding of benefit
commitments. Almost all plans have some degree of advance funding,
and the practice has been growing. The ratio of incoming revenue to

benefit payments is currently around 2.6 to 1 for public employee plans.
More importantly, assets are now about eighteen times the annual

benefit payments, a ratio which is 50 percent higher than that of thirty
years ago.4 4 Nevertheless, the funds that are being set aside today will
still not be sufficient to pay fully for the generous future retirement

benefits that have already been promised. In actuarial language, the
pension plans are not "fully funded."45
Only one state, Massachusetts, has adopted an explicit policy of not
funding any benefits in advance and operating on a pay-as-you-go
basis. 40 The advocates of pay-as-you-go point to the Social Security
system as a model. In that system, the ability of the federal government
to tax is the ultimate guarantee that future benefits will be paid. The

question in adopting this policy for cities is whether or not the city's
future ability to raise revenues is a sufficient guarantee of pension
promises. There now exists a national policy, embodied inthe Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 7 which requires
pension obligations of private employers to be funded in advance. At
below the national average. See Sunley, supra note 9, at 380 (Table 9-5). But see
Kalman, Comment, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 491 (1974) (suggesting that such figures are
misleading).
43. Although the data to make comprehensive comparisons of public and private
benefit levels are not available, Tilove did compare average benefit levels for "typical"
employees in New York State. Typical employees are those who may retire at age sixty
after thirty years of service on a pension of at least 50 per cent of average pay for the
last five years of service, and who are covered by Social Security. R. TILOVE, PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUNDS 9 (1976).

Tilove found that public employee benefits (ex-

clusive of Social Security) tended to be 1 % to two times higher than those paid to private
employees at comparable salary levels. Id. at 58-59 (Table 3.3). Even with Social
Security included, the public benefits were substantially higher at all levels. Id. Exclusive of Social Security, the public benefits ranged as high as 49 percent of final salary.
Id. But see Kalman, supra note 42.
44. R. TILOVE, supra note 43, at 172.
45. For an overview of the economics of pension funding, see Bahl & Jump, The
Budgetary Implications of Rising Employee Retirements System Costs, 27 NAT'L TAX J.
479 (1974); Jump, supra note 39; Thomas, supra note 38.
46. R. TILOvi, supra note 43, at 131.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq., (Supp. IV, 1974).
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the time of the passage of that act, Congress debated whether public
employee plans should be subject to the same requirement. 48 Fearing
that such a requirement might place a large financial burden on cities
that were already hard-pressed, Congress chose not to apply ERISA
funding requirements to the public sector.49
Adopting a relatively full measure of advance funding is much
easier for a growing city than for a mature or declining city. In
comparison to a mature city with a more level work force, a growing city
has fewer employees with long years of service and fewer retirees or
employees close to retirement relative to the overall size of its work
force. These older employees are the most expensive in terms of
pension contributions. While advance funding is probably a moot
policy issue for the hard-pressed declining city (since a move to advance
funding only makes a bad cash flow situation that much worse), a
growing city that is planning for its own maturity can make relatively
modest contributions today which would do much to avoid the dramatic
ballooning of retirement costs that comes with a maturing pay-as-you-go
system. 50
The level of funding is extremely important to the security of an
employee's pension. To the extent that a plan is funded, the employee's
pension is secure. The assets which will be used to pay the pensioner
upon retirement have already been paid out by the government and are
in the possession of an independent retirement fund. To the extent that
the plan is not funded, however, the fund and its members are in no
better position to force payment than the city's other creditors, and,
where a city is unwilling or unable to pay its obligations, it may be
extremely difficult for creditors to force payment. 51 Where a municipal
pension plan is not fully funded, the pension plan should, at the very
least, require the government to pledge its full faith and credit toward
payment. This pledge should give the fund the highest possible preferred
status among the city's creditors. 52 An effort might also be made to
48. See S. REP. No. 93-1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 291 (1974)(summarizing previous
versions of ERISA and the final compromise).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (b) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
50. It should also be pointed out that these decisions about contribution levels for
a city's employees may be out of the hands of municipal officials. This is because many local employees are members of state-wide systems which determine their
own funding practices and in turn levy assessments on local governments.
51. See Note, Creditors' Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1363.
52. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358
N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (Emergency Moratorium Act postponing claims
of holders of "full faith and credit" bonds violates state constitution). It seems likely
that a pension fund which has been pledged the city's full faith and credit will be given
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include an explicit declaration in the pension agreement that pension
fund payments are to be treated as operational expenses in the event of
bankruptcy. Such a provision may allow the government to continue to
make pension payments as part of its ongoing operation during a period
of financial reorganization."
A second problem arises with respect to the city's ability to continue to benefit from capital it has paid over to its employees' pension fund.
Even though most systems are nowhere near fully funded, they still
possess sizeable assets. The New York City situation has raised the
issue of the propriety of using such assets to aid the city. After New
York's Municipal Assistance Corporation found itself unable to market
its securities in the fall of 1975, the city arranged to sell over $2.5 billion
in serial bonds to its employees' retirement funds. 54 Such transactions
call into question the whole rationale for requiring advance funding at
all. If the city makes a contribution with one hand and borrows it back
with the other, it is a "wash" transaction even though a liability
exists on the city's books and an asset exists on the books of the pension
fund. These funds thus begin to look much more like the "surplus"
account of the municipality than a trusteed pension fund.
On the other hand, the use of such funds as an emergency measure
in a municipal liquidity crisis may have some real justification when it is
realized that the major prospective claimants (or owners) of those funds
are the current employees of the city. These employees have much to
lose (such as pay checks) if the city finds itself unable to meet its
current obligations.
Fortunately, the potential for government use of pension plan
assets in periods of finanical distress is narrowly limited by the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Although local governments are
themselves tax-exempt entities55 which derive no added advantage from
preferred status over bondholders in a court of equity. Unlike the bondholder who
extracts a risk premium as part of the city's interest payments, an employee does not
contemplate any danger that his pension will not be paid. See Note, supra note 51, at
1372.
53. See Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 409
(Supp. 2, Part 1, 1976). See generally King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old
and New: Chapter IX Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 63 (1976); King, Municipal
Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1157.
Such an arrangement may be unnecessary to protect continued payments which are
required according to provisions of the employees' wage contracts. However, explicit
provision may be necessary to give priority to payments to retired employees. It seems
reasonable to argue that such payments are necessary to maintain municipal operations
since, if they are cut off, municipal employees are likely to strike.
54. H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 115.
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maintaining the tax-exempt status of a pension plan, important tax
advantages are available to employee members of pension plans that
qualify for tax-exempt status under the Code. Employees covered by
qualified plans may defer payment of taxes on employer contributions
made on their behalf until they actually begin to receive benefits. 56 If a
plan is disqualified, the employees lose this important tax advantage and
wil be taxed on their interests in the plan as they vestY7 Qualified
plans also provide certain special allowances for income averaging and
estate and gift tax benefits which are not available to members of
unqualified plans. 8 The value of these tax benefits to government
employees is an important factor in encouraging governmental employers to design qualified plans.5 9
Where a qualified plan exists, all of the fund's assets must be used
for the exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries," and the
trust is prohibited from lending any part of its income or corpus to any
party making substantial contributions to the plan or to the plan's
creator without adequate security and an adequate rate of interest.0 '
Where the plan violates the "exclusive benefit rule" or enters into a
"prohibited transaction," the entire plan loses its tax-exempt status.02
An agreement by a qualified plan to purchase or retain securities of
a governmental unit during a period of financial stress will necessarily
endanger the tax-exempt status of the plan.6 3 If the agreement is
designed to improve the fiscal status of the city, the transaction will not
be for the exclusive benefit of the members of the retirement plan. Even
if it is emphasized that the employees may lose their jobs should the city
collapse, it is unlikely that the exclusive benefit rule can be satisfied;
such a transaction would benefit many others who have no interest in
56. Id. § 402(b); see H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976); STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., APPLICATION OF PENSION PROVISIONS TO NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 2-3 (Comm.

Print 1976).
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(b); see H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1976).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
59. See id.
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a).
61. Id. § 503(1)(B)(1). See also id. § 402(a)(1). The reference to other persons
making substantial contributions may be important in the government context. Where
several units of government make contributions to a plan, they may all be covered by
the prohibited transaction provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
62. Compare id. § 401(a) (exclusive benefit rule) with id. § 503(1)(B) (prohibited transactions); see H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1976).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
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the plan and would endanger vested interests of retired employees who
may no longer have any direct financial stake in the operation of the
city.
More importantly, it will probably be extremely difficult for a city
to offer the kind of security which would be needed for a plan to avoid
disqualification under the prohibited transaction rule in making a loan to
its creator. The Internal Revenue Service has "taken the position that
the pledge of an employer's general assets does not provide adequate
security for purposes of the prohibited transaction rules, '64 and the
amorphous nature of the obligation which underlies the pledge of a
municipality's full faith and credit65 makes a municipal security substantially less secure than a pledge of the general assets of a private sector
employer. While it may be possible to solve the security problem by a
loan guarantee from the state or preferably the federal government,66 it
seems clear that an arrangement for a municipal employee pension plan
to invest in its employer city will be difficult to consummate unless
members of the plan are willing to lose the advantages of their taxexempt status. Only federal legislation can protect the tax exemption of
7
such funds .
The pension systems in cities that are essentially on a pay-as-yougo basis are, in effect, making long-term loans to their cities. It would
make little sense for such cities to begin substantial advance funding of
their pension plans if their financial situation would require them to turn
around and borrow those funds back. However, there would be some
advantage in this course; the current costs of pension benefits would
have to be calculated and funds set aside (at least on the books). This
could serve as a brake on excessively generous pension settlements since
any increased commitments would show up as expenditures which were
then offset by increased borrowing. The other alternative is to show the
unfunded pension liability directly and hope that such disclosure will
itself be a sufficient constraint on the level of pension settlements.
64. Id., citing Rev. Rul. 70-131, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 135.
65. See generally Note, supra note 51.
66. The federal government is the preferable source since it, with its power to print
money, is presumptively secure. State obligations may create the same collection
problems as municipal obligations. Members of the House Ways and Means Committee,
which reported the bill that ultimately exempted the New York transaction from the
Internal Revenue Code's exclusive benefit and prohibited transaction provisions, questioned the capacity of that transaction to escape disqualification as a prohibited transaction, H.R. REP. No. 94-851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976), despite New York State's
enactment of legislation to indemnify the fund trustees against loss. Id. at 4.
67. See id. at 7 (this is what occurred in New York City); 90 Stat. 238 (1976).

B.
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Social Security

Another significant issue facing local officials as they consider the
means of controlling costs is the role played by Social Security. Local
governments can participate in Social Security on a voluntary basis. 8
Many local governments have taken advantage of this option. In the
fourteen years from 1961 to 1975, coverage of public employees nearly
tripled, from 3 million to almost 9 million, so that about 70 percent of
the state and local work force is now covered by Social Security..69 Once
a local government has joined the Social Security system, it can exercise
a one-time option to get out again. This decision does not need to be
approved by its employees. 70 Because of the general financial pressures
faced by local governments and because of the steady increase in Social
Security payroll tax rates, many local governments have begun to con71
sider exercising their option to drop out of the Social Security system.
There are basically two perspectives from which to confront the
Social Security issue. One is the national policy perspective which
focuses on the potential impact of public employee withdrawals on the
condition of the Social Security trust funds. Current estimates indicate
that the recent proposed withdrawal of New York City employees alone
would have caused a $3.1 billion loss in contributions between 1978 and
1982 without any concomitant reduction in the outflow of benefits,
72
since the withdrawal would not affect those already entitled to benefits.
Over the long run, there is concern that the system will be weakened
both in terms of financial soundness and public support by government
68. 42 U.S.C. § 41&(A)(1)(1970).
69. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
SOCIAL SECURITY

COVERAGE:

94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,

THE IMPACT ON STATE

AND

TERMINATION

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

OF
EM-

See also STAFF ON THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL
PLOYEES 4-5 (Comm. Print 1976).
SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG. 2D SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES AND
EMPLOYEES OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Print

1976),

in

HearingsBefore the

Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means on Coverage and
Termination of Coverage of Government and Nonprofit Organization Employees Under
the Social Security System, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 418(G)(1) (1970); SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra
note 69, at 4.
71. To terminate its coverage by Social Security, a local government must give two
years advance notice. 42 U.S.C. § 418(G) (1) (1970). Until recently, 500,000 employees had been members of groups in eleven states that had termination notices pending.
The largest group of these was 362,000 employees in New York City, SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 4-5; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
supra note 69, at 8, which recently withdrew its termination notice.
72. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 9. See note 71
supra.
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employer withdrawals. First, there is a general feeling that public
employees (and their employers) currently put more into the system
than they take out, so that the federal government has a great financial
incentive to keep state and local governments in the system. Second,
although that portion of the public sector which participates in Social
Security generally makes the system fiscally stronger, windfall benefits
may accrue to employees of non-participating governments who spend
enough time in the private sector to qualify for minimum Social Security
protection. 73 Finally, to the extent that Social Security is viewed as a
national insurance program, there is a concern that inadequate protection
74
will be given to public employees under other plans.
The other perspective is that of the local government itself. If the
local government is financially hard-pressed, Social Security termination
can provide some immediate fiscal relief. 75 On the other hand, the local
government may take the longer view and consider the question of
whether or not Social Security is a "good buy" in terms of the benefits
received for the taxes paid. Even in this case, the local government may
decide that it is advantageous to terminate its participation if only the
impact on current employees is considered, since many of these employees will have already earned entitlement to basic Social Security
benefits and future benefit increases for them may be small relative to
the taxes to be paid. Finally, even if the local government finds the
benefits to be a "good buy" for its current or future employees, it may
still decide that the particular types of benefits offered by Social Security
are not the ones that it wishes to purchase for its employees. The government may prefer more generous retirement benefits and less disability
benefits, for example. In any case, there will continue to be increased
pressures in the near future for local governments to consider withdrawal, 70 and this trend will undoubtedly stimulate serious discussions
73. STAFF OF Tr SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 10. Windfalls
occur because those with lowest earnings and therefore lowest contributions receive back
in the form of benefits a much higher percentage of their contributions than do those in
higher wage brackets.
74. Id. at 8-10; see Myers, Should State and Local Governments Desert the Social
Security Ship?, 37 TAx REv. 37 (1976). See generally SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING, supra note 69, at 9-27.

75. New York City, for example, would avoid payment of $250 million per year in
social security payroll taxes if it were to terminate. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
supra note 69, at 8.
76. In addition to the financial pressures on governments, employee pressure for
more take-home pay, the well-publicized fears that Social Security taxes will continue to
rise or that the system will go broke, and the belief of many employees that they will be
eligible for benefits in any event, have all contributed to the recent increase in
terminations. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 6-8.

Vol. 1976:1057]

FINANCING THE CITIES

1075

in Congress concerning modification of the Social Security Act's state
and local government termination provisions.
Indeed, Congress has already begun such a reappraisal. The
major alternatives currently being discussed include:
(1) Making coverage compulsory for all state and local government
employees;
(2) Repealing the current termination provisions so that governments
which are currently part of the system cannot quit;
(3) Coupling compulsory coverage with treatment of public employees
as "self-employed" persons for purposes of the Act;
(4) Making termination conditions more restrictive by requiring em77
ployee consent or by freezing benefits.
From the perspective of federal policy, the first alternative, compulsory coverage, is clearly the preferred option. It remedies the termination problem, eliminates windfalls, and helps to fill in gaps in protection of those who move between jobs which are or are not covered by
78
Social Security.
Unfortunately, there may be significant constitutional impediments
to federal legislation requiring state and local government participation
in the Social Security system. Authority for the payroll tax on which
the Social Security system is based is derived from the taxing power in
article I of the Constitution. 9 Public employees have historically been
exempted from the mandatory coverage provisions of the Social Security
Act because of fear that any general levy of the employer tax on state
and local governments would be unconstitutional."0 While there has
been some feeling in recent years that this problem could be overcome
under the present state of the law, any doubts that a mandatory tax on
state and local government would encounter constitutional obstacles were
clearly dispelled by the recent Supreme Court decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery.8 ' In Usery, the Supreme Court struck down
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)1 2 that required
77. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 22-27; STAFF OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 11-15.
78. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 11.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 1.
80. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 5;
Myers, supra note 74, at 38.

81. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

See generally Comment, Federal Regulation of Munici-

pal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261.

82.

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(S)(5),(X)(Supp. 1976).

The Court cited the rarely

invoked tenth amendment as support for its holding that, in light of the constitutional
policies of federalism and state sovereignty, some provisions of the FLSA extended
beyond the power granted to Congress in the commerce clause. 426 U.S. at 842-45.
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state and local governments to pay their employees the minimum

wage."' Concluding that the imposition of minimum wage standards
on local governments would interfere with the states' sovereignty by
affecting service levels and employment decisions,"' the plurality held
that Congress could not impose the FLSA on the states since the

concept of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment prohibits the
federal government from impairing "the States' freedom to structure

integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."85
While Usery is explicitly limited to the commerce clause, 6 it seems
clear that the reasoning in the case would also be applied to the taxing

power.8 7

Such a result is particularly likely in light of the similarity

between the effects of the minimum wage standards struck down in

Usery and those of the payroll tax which proponents of compulsory
coverage would impose on state and local governments. At least in the

short run, the effect of a payroll tax on public employers would be the
same as that of the minimum wage. Governmental units not presently
participating in the Social Security system would be deprived of funds

which they would otherwise have been able to devote to services. Governments that are currently members of the system would be deprived of
the opportunity to redesign their compensation packages in ways that
would be cheaper for their communities or in ways they think would be
more successful in attracting individuals into public service. This same
difficulty would arise if the federal government were to attempt to
U.S. CONST. amend. X provides as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
83. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849-52 (1976). For a
description of the particular provisions of the FLSA which are affected by the decision,
see id. at 835-40.
84. See id. at 844-48.
85. Id. at 851-52. The decision in Usery is explicitly applicable to local governmental units since, as their denomination "political subdivision" implies, these units
derive their authority and power from their respective states. Id. at 855 n.20.
86. Id. at 852 n.17.
87. There is a tension in the plurality opinion on this point. While Justice
Rehnquist specifically left open the question of the tenth amendment's effect on the
spending power, id., the reasoning of the decision relied heavily on earlier cases
concerning the authority of Congress to impose taxes on the states. See id. at 842-45.
However, the Court is presently in the process of giving increasing respect to "state
rights" in a number of areas of the law. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (local police discretion). See generally Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the
Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523. There is no
reason to expect that this trend will not manifest itself in the tax area as well. As
Justice Rehnquist explained in his opinion for the Usery plurality, the "Court has never
doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty,
even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax . . . ." 426 U.S. at 842.
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eliminate provisions which presently allow governmental participants in
the Social Security system to terminate.
It appears that compulsory coverage can be accomplished, Usery
notwithstanding, by shifting Congress' focus from the employer to the
employee. The tenth amendment should not be read to circumscribe
the power of Congress to tax employees of other levels of government. It
is now well established, for example, that the official salaries of all state
employees, including governors, are subject to taxation by the federal
government. 8 There does not appear to be any constitutional reason
why Congress could not require public employees to participate in the
Social Security system, impose a payroll tax on the employee to fund the
system, and require all governmental employers to make appropriate
collections. Such a scheme could be enmeshed with the present system
of income tax withholding, since it has previously been established that
the federal government may require the states or their political subdivisions to withhold taxes from their employees."9
The critical issue is the level at which public employees should be
taxed under a compulsory provision. Any attempt to require coverage
that subjects only public employees to the employee payroll tax rate
without exacting matching contributions from governmental employers
would put an additional strain on the Social Security system which
would have to be borne by other contributors. 90 On the other hand,
taxing public employees at a rate which would cover both the employer
and employee contributions in the private sector would be seen as
placing an unfair burden on public employees and could constitute an
important deterrent to those considering public service. In fact, however, the effective burden of this tax does not depend on the sources
from which it is collected. A payroll tax will impose the same burden
on employees regardless of whether it is collected from the employer,
from the employee, or partially from both. 91 This would argue for a
requirement that a shift to an all-employee tax be accompanied by
matching salary increases so that both the employee's after-tax salary
and the government's payroll costs will remain unchanged. Unfortu88. E.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).

See also Sims

v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959).
89. Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold

federal income taxes from wages paid employees. The term "employer," as defined in
section 3401(d), has been construed to include the states and their agencies, instrumentalities and subdivisions. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-l(d) (1957).
90. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 11.
91. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

410-13 (2d ed. 1976).

1078

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1976:1057

nately, the reasoning of Usery would clearly preclude the federal government from imposing such a mandate on state and local governments.
Even so, if a city's economic conditions do not change, market forces
can be expected to force employee salaries to this level over time in any
case. For employees of governments that are not currently participating
in Social Security, any requirement of employee participation will impose
a new tax burden along with the new expectation of benefits. In the
long run, however, the market should function so that the burden on
these employees will be the same whether the Social Security tax is
assessed on the employee, employer, or shared between the two. Unfortunately, this fact is unlikely to be recognized by the employees who
would see sizeable portions of their paychecks going to Social Security
even after market forces begin to offset this burden.
The solution that has been proposed for this dilemma is to tax
public employees as if they were self-employed.92 This would expose
the public workforce to a payroll tax rate that is higher than the
employee rate but lower than the combined employer-employee rate of
contribution found in the public sector. 93 A similar approach is currently employed with respect to participating members of several other
vocations such as clergy and employees of foreign governments where
94
the federal government cannot tax the employer.
The difficulty with the compulsory coverage/self-employed-rate approach lies in the anticipated response of state and local governments.
Compulsory employee participation would tend to induce governmental
units to forgo participation in the Social Security system, since they
would be able to avoid the cost of the employer contribution without
jeopardizing their employees' protection. 95 Unless market conditions or
political considerations force participating localities to remain in the
system, compulsory employee participation at a self-employed rate is
therefore likely to encourage government employer terminations. 9
While retaining public employee contributors even at the self-employed
rate will help the Social Security system to overcome its short-run
92. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 31-32.

69, at 12; see SENATE

93. Under the current private sector payment schedule, employers and employees
each contribute amounts equal to 5.85 percent of the employee's earnings while the selfemployed pay 7.90 percent. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 31.
See also STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 12.

94. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 12.
95. Id.
96. To some extent, this situation may be justified by the relief it affords the cities
during the current period of financial strain.
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financial problems, the lower per capita contribution levels resulting
from self-employed status may contribute to a serious problem in the
long run. Unless municipal employees as a group in Social Security are
at least self-supporting over the long term, there is no ultimate fiscal
advantage to compulsory participation.
Nevertheless, it appears that compulsory coverage at the self-employed rate is superior to the proposals to modify the Social Security
Act's state and local government termination provisions for several reasons. First, while modification may help to slow governmental terminations, none of the proposals will satisfactorily insure continuous coverage
or eliminate windfalls for the numerous public employees who are not
currently in the system. Freezing benefit levels to deter terminations
would be difficult to administer and, from a national viewpoint, would
be counterproductive since it could eventually leave many public employees with inadequate coverage. 97 Proposals to condition termination
on certification that benefit levels under a replacement plan would be
comparable to those under Social Security or an approval of a majority
of employees have similar shortcomings. 8 Finally, there are some
important legal questions concerning the ability of the federal government to unilaterally amend the termination provisions at all.09
III.

REVENUES

Between 1962 and 1975, the non-capital general expenditures of
American cities have increased by 376 percent. 10 During the same
period, general revenues from cities' own sources rose by only 289

In fiscal 1975, American cities were spending over $11
percent.'
operations than they were raising from
billion more on their current
02
their own revenue sources.Y
Whatever the reason for this dramatic increase in the expenditures
for municipal services, it is quite clear that the cities are no longer
financing their current service levels out of their own revenue sources.
97. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 14.
98. See SENATE SPEcIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note 69, at 19-21 (suggesting that
the employees' short-term interests in higher pay may make them insensitive to the

longer range issues of retirement benefits).
99. Id. at 32; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 69, at 14.
100. Compare U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 197475, Table 1 (1976), with U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN
1964-65, Table 1 (1966).
101. Id.

102. See U.S.
Table 1 (1976).

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES

IN

1974-75,
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As Figure 1 illustrates, in the early 1960s cities of all sizes financed
virtually all of their non-capital general expenditures from their own
revenue sources.
Today, as Figure 2 indicates, the average city receives only 61
percent of its general revenues from its own resources.' 0 3 This phenomenon is closely related to urban size. The twenty-nine cities with
populations of more than 500,000 obtained only 54 percent of their
general revenues from their own sources in 1975, down from 63 percent
in 1969 and from 78 percent as recently as 1965.104
The impact that this increasing reliance on outside aid has had on
local tax burdens is suggested by the last two columns in Table 3.
Column 3 shows the ratio of the percentage change in intergovernmental aid to the percentage increase in own-source revenues for the period
between fiscal years 1970 and 1975. If both outside aid and ownsource revenues increased at the same rate over this period, the ratio
shown in column 3 would be equal to one. This would mean that both
outside aid and own-source revenues continued to comprise the same
share of total general revenues in the two years examined. If, on the
other hand, outside aid grew twice as fast as own-source revenues (e.g.,
100 percent and 50 percent respectively), then the ratio in column 3
would be equal to two. The ratios in this column are thus indicative of
the rate at which dependence on outside revenue sources has changed
over the period. A ratio greater than one means that outside aid
dependence has increased, and a ratio less than one means that this
dependence has decreased. Column 4 shows the absolute increase in
own-source revenues as a percentage of after-tax personal income which
occurred between fiscal years 1970 and 1975. Although they do not
take into account revenues that may be raised through special districts or
other arrangements which do not run funds through city accounts, the
figures in this column are suggestive of the effective tax burdens these
cities are placing directly on their citizens.
In analyzing Table 3, one fact stands out: the large cities examined increased their outside revenue sources at an average of six times
the rate at which they increased their own revenues from local sources: °
While this rate of increase varied widely from city to city, only three
cities-San Francisco, Denver and Seattle-failed to increase outside aid
more rapidly than own-source revenues over this period.
103. See id. Table 5.

104. See Figure 2 of this text. The 78 percent derived from own-source revenues was
nearly equal to the total non-capital expenditures of the cities in 1965. This is not
surprising since most aid to cities at that time was for capital expenditures.
105. In Table 3, column 3, which reflects this rate, the average ratio is 5.96.
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TABLE 3
Changes in Municipal Dependence on Intergovernmental
Aid and Municipal Tax Burdens, 1970-1975
Change in Aid
Relative to
Change in Own1975
1975
Source Revenues
Aid Dependencea Tax Burdenb 1970-1975c

Baltimore
Buffalo
Memphis
New York City
Milwaukee
Indianapolis
Phoenix
Detroit
Cincinnati
Jacksonville
New Orleans
Pittsburgh
Cleveland
San Diego
San Francisco
Boston
Philadelphia
Chicago
Denver
Atlanta
St. Louis
San Antonio
Seattle
Columbus
Honolulu
Los Angeles
Kansas City, Mo.
Houston
Dallas

64.2%
59.7
58.8
52.7
50.1
42.9
41.8
40.2
37.8
37.8
37.1
36.8
35.0
34.9
34.5
33.9
32.3
31.4
31.1
30.4
28.9
29.6
28.1
28.0
25.7
24.8
24.1
16.0
14.2

10.05%
6.65
3.80
14.26
3.85
3.29
2.93
5.81
11.72
4.88
4.81
3.50
5.48
2.78
9.38
13.38
6.80
4.37
7.39
6.15
7.94
2.71
4.05
3.75
7.04
4.18
6.13
3.32
3.83

2.97
2.92
2.31
1.78
2.74
9.81
3.52
4.21
2.05
12.83
7.84
14.03
20.84
5.20
.71
3.81
8.73
2.17
.95
4.52
12.38
14.79
.52
1.57
3.71
2.60
5.56
8.90
8.44

Change in
Revenue
Burden
1970-1975d
-

-

-

-

.23
1.16
.95
3.01
.08
1.05
.04
.42
3.03
1.41
.25
.53
.01
.34
.34
.11
.54
.71
1.66
1.45
.46
.36
.70
.47
.29
.48
.94
.36
.34

a Intergovernmental revenues divided by total general revenues.
b Own-source revenues divided by total after-tax personal income.
c Percentage change in aid divided by percentage change in own-source revenues.
This figure indicates the rate of change in outside revenues relative to the rate of change
of own-source revenues. A value equal to one indicates that aid grew at the same rate
during the period examined as own-source revenues.
d Absolute increase in the ratio of own-source revenues to after-tax personal
income.
SOURCES: SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1976 SURVEY OF BUYING POWER, Section D
(1976) (1975 after-tax income); SALES MANAGEMENT, INC., 1971 SURVEY
OF BUYING POWER, Section D (1971) (1970 after-tax income); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES 1974-75, Table 5

(1976) (intergovernmental revenues, own-source revenues and total general revenues-fiscal 1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES 1969-70, Table 5 (1971) (intergovernmental revenues,

own-source revenues and total general revenues-fiscal 1970).
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More importantly, a comparison of columns 3 and 4 shows that
this rapid expansion of outside aid has held down the revenue burden
placed on citizens of larger cities to an average increase of less than onehalf of one percent of after-tax personal income, although here again
there is substantial variation from city to city. Nineteen of these twentynine big cities were able to keep the tax burden on their citizens virtually
unchanged 10 6 by heavier reliance on the outside aid. 10 7 Among these
were four cities that increased the proportion of outside revenues
substantially' 8 in order to keep tax burdens from increasing, and one
city, Memphis, which was actually able to reduce local tax burdens
substantially with only a modest increase in reliance on outside aid.
Memphis was able to do this only through sizeable annexations, an
alternative which was not available to the other larger cities.
At the other end of the spectrum are the cities that have increased
the revenue burden on their citizens. The two cities that imposed the
most substantial increases in burdens on their populations between 1970
and 1975-New York City and Cincinnati--did not greatly increase
their reliance on outside aid.' 09 These cities relied heavily on outside
aid to start with, so any substantial expansion would have been difficult.
Two other cities-Denver and Seattle-let their local revenue burdens
increase while the rate of growth in outside aid fell behind the rate of
their own revenue growth. Only one other city, San Francisco, has also
had a recent rate of increase in own-source revenues that exceeds the rate
of increase in outside aid. Even so, the increase in personal income in
San Francisco actually reduced the relative revenue burden on its citizens.
The substantial increase in reliance on outside sources of revenue
in the last decade has kept tax burdens imposed by the nation's largest
cities fairly constant relative to their citizens' ability to pay. However,
this is a trend that cannot continue indefinitely. In 1975, there were
already five of these large cities which got more than half of their
general revenues from outside sources.
There are indications that some cities have already reached the
limit of their capacity to obtain outside aid to cover expenditure growth.
106. Relative, that is, to after-tax personal income.
107. Those nineteen cities which kept the change in tax burden to less than 0.5 percent of after-tax personal income also increased outside aid at 6.8 times the rate they
increased own-source revenues. See column 3 of Table 3.
108. Cleveland, Pittsburgh, San Antonio and St. Louis increased their outside revenues at an average of about 15 times the rate at which they increased their own-source
revenues.
109. See columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.
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New York City and Buffalo, for example, had three characteristics in
common over the period 1970 to 1975. First, they began the period
with an already heavy reliance on outside aid. Second, they were able
to expand that dependence on outside aid at less than one-half the rate
achieved by the other big cities over this period. Third, they greatly
increased the fiscal burden on their own citizens. These factors indicate
that both Buffalo and New York City have largely reached the limits on
expansion of outside revenue sources and that the burden of increased
expenditures has begun to be borne by their taxpayers.
Many of the other large cities face the same prospect in the
immediate future. They can expect to find less rapidly expanding
outside aid and will be forced to balance budgets with a combination of
expenditure controls and additional revenues from their own resources.
The remaining discussion in this section describes some of the difficulties the cities will encounter in expanding their revenue sources.
A.

The PropertyTax

In large part, the pattern of rising expenditures has placed increased pressure on the property tax. Cities of all sizes rely on the
property tax for about 42 percent of the general revenues they collect
from their own sources." 0 In the past, this heavy reliance on the
property tax has been founded on two main rationales. First, there has
been the notion that the property tax contributes to an equitable financing of local government by putting the tax burden on those who benefit
most from municipal services" 1' and by enhancing local control over tax
structure and rates." 2 All those who own or rent 3 homes or places of
business in a city benefit from the police and fire protection, street
maintenance and sewage systems which most cities provide. All of
those who live in a city (as homeowners or as renters) are able to vote
110. U.S. BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1974-75, Table 1

(1976).
111. See, e.g., L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN LOCAL GovERNMENT FINANCE 126, 130 (1975); Harriss, Property Taxation: What's Good and

What's Bad About It, 33 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 89, 90-91 (1974).
112. H. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? A NEW VIEW 55 (1975); see R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 91, at 349.

113. Although renters are not usually taxed directly, real property taxes have been
generally assumed to be shifted forward by landlords to their tenants. E.g., Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630-31, (1969). The extent to which
this occurs will depend on general market conditions in a particular area. H. AARON,
supra note 112, at 32-38, 42-43; see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 91, at 43536.
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and can thereby control both tax rates and local

service levels.

Second, the property tax has historically provided a relatively stable
taxable resource for local government. Once a particular area is incorporated into a municipality's boundaries, it is extremely difficult to remove
that land from the city's tax base." 15 While a slight tax increase will
normally lead to a decline in the quantity of the thing being taxed, the
116
quantity of land in a city can rarely be increased or reduced.
The relative invulnerability of land values to fluctuations in the
economy also contributes to the consistency of taxes on land as a source
of revenue. While sales receipts and income may decline drastically,
assessed land values generally remain fairly constant in a recessionary
period.

7

A further attraction of a property tax is that it may actually

promote higher property values as owners of dormant or low-productivity property are forced to develop their properties in order to insure that
114. It is well settled that property ownership may not be established as a
prerequisite to voting eligibility in tax referenda, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (school district property tax), unless the tax is levied
by a special purpose district the function of which is so far removed from normal
governmental activities and the effect of which is so disproportionate that one man-one
vote would be inappropriate. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973). See generally City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970) (property ownership cannot be a prerequisite to franchise in referendum
on general election bonds); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (same for
revenue bonds).
115. While the laws of many states provide procedures for area secession, see, e.g., 2
E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 7.24-.25 (3d ed., rev. vol.,
1966), this process is both difficult and uncommon.
116. See H. AARON, supra note 112, at 20-22, 40; Harriss, supra note 111, at 98.
Landfills and annexation, plans for both of which may be sensitive to property tax rates,
are the major exceptions. H. AARON, supra note 112, at 40. Where land surrounding a
city is not yet urbanized and is subject to a lower tax rate than land in the city, more
rapid urbanization of the outlying area may result. See id. at 40-41. As long as state
law permits annexation, the city can then increase its property tax base by incorporating
this newly developed land into its boundaries. But see notes 3-21 supra and 144-51 infra
and accompanying text.
The notion that land is in fixed supply is the primary reason for economists'
traditional advocacy of land taxes. H. AARON, supra note 112, at 40, citing D. NETZER,
ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 197-212 (1966), and sources cited therein.

117. As a practical matter, the consistency of the property tax base, particularly over
short-term recessions, is the result of the relatively low speed of the property assessment
process. Even if the value of land or a structure declines, this will not affect its owners'
tax bill until the property is reassessed. Unless the change is so sudden that a
special assessment can be obtained, this process can take several years, by which time the
economy may have already begun to improve and the property may have returned to its
original value.
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the land yields a return substantial enough to pay the taxes assessed and
still provide a profit. 118
Unfortunately, the traditional view about the stability of the property tax base overlooks important long-term consequences of such taxes.
The property tax is not one tax but two: it is a tax on land, and it is a
tax on structures built on the land. While the supply of land in a city is
relatively fixed, the supply of capital available to develop or to maintain
property in that city is variable; it depends on the relationship between
the rate of return from capital investment there and the rate of return
elsewhere."' Thus, since the owner of land in a high tax jurisdiction
will have to bear the burden of any increase in 'his property taxes caused
by a rise in the value of his land, he will cease to put money into the
development of that property unless he can obtain as high a return from
that use of his capital as he can from other investments. Imposition of a
propery tax increase may thus precipitate a departure of capital from
the jurisdiction, and that departure will continue until the rate of return
on property investment in that jurisdiction once again equals the rate of
return for capital in the rest of the capital market.' 20
This departure of capital has important consequences for the housing and labor markets in a high tax jurisdiction. First, the cost of
housing in the high tax jurisdiction is likely to increase.' 2 ' As capital
departs the jurisdiction, both the quantity and quality of housing will
decline. Old assets will be allowed to deteriorate, and new construction
will be rare. As the housing supply deteriorates, the cost of housing
will, of course, go up as people are increasingly willing to pay more for
less. A second effect of the departure of capital will be a decline in the
wages of laborers who remain in the high tax jurisdiction.12 2 The
118. See L. MoAK &A. HILLHOUSE, supra note 111, at 130. The landowner may also
decide to sell his property to someone who can afford to make the appropriate
investment.
119. See H. AARON, supra note 112, at 38-40; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 91, at 430-37. The discussion which follows is drawn from both of these works.
120. In this respect the real property tax functions much like a corporate income tax.
For a particularly useful explanation of the equalization of net returns which results
from an increase in these kinds of taxes, see R. MUSRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note
91, at 416-18.
121. See id. at 432-33. In some financially strained cities, the mere threat of a
potential tax increase may be a potent deterrent to improvements of central city
residential properties. D. NETzER, IMPACr OF THE PROPERTY TAX: EFF Cr ON HousING, URBAN LAND USE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, 21-22 (Comm. Print 1968)
(prepared for Joint Economic Comm. of Congress, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.).
122. See H. AARON, supra note 112, at 41-44; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 91, at 433; cf. id. at 418-19 (analogous effects of corporate income tax increases
on wages).
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decrease in capital investment will be accompanied by a decline in the
demand for labor. 123
As demand for labor falls, lower salaries will
1 4
necessarily result. 1
Escalating taxes have combined with other factors such as the
recent recession, racial motivations and a preference for lower population density to produce a substantial shift in population and employment

opportunities away from America's aging central cities. This decrease
in business and population has contributed to an erosion of the property
tax base in many central cities. As central city residents and businesses
depart for the suburbs or for other regions of the country, the demand

for land in the central city can only decrease.' 25 This decrease in
demand is necessarily followed by a decline in the value of land and
housing and thus by an erosion of the city's tax base. 2 6

Whether net emigration is the result of excessive tax burdens or
other factors, it has clearly contributed to an erosion of the tax base in
the central cities. Moreover, as the tax base shrinks, the tax rate must

be increased to maintain current expenditure levels.

This in turn

intensifies the pressure for residents to leave their homes in stable inner

city communities where property values have remained relatively con123. Tax rates clearly play an important role in the location decisions of major
industries. In a recent speech before the National Tax Association, the senior vice
president of E.I. duPont de Nemours Company explained that local tax and debt levels
accounted for 45 of the 100 points which duPont allots in choosing locations for its
new plants. Heckert, Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities-TheBusiness Point of View, 29
One would expect that duPont's criteria are similar to
NAT'L TAX J. 336, 337 (1976).
those used by other major industries. See id.
124. In some areas which are highly dependent on industries in which labor and
capital can be easily substituted for one another, the downward pressure on wages may
be mitigated. See H. AARON, supra note 112, at 42-43; cf. R. MusGRAVE & P. MU5GRAVE,
supra note 91, at 418 n.4.
125. According to Aaron, "Differences in tax rates within metropolitan areas are
likely to be reflected primarily in land values." H. AARON, supra note 112, at 44. If
market response can be taken as an indicator, it is clear that the demand for suburban
housing is presently much stronger than that for housing in the central cities. "Of new
housing constructed between 1970 and 1974, 45 percent was located in suburban areas,
while 21 percent [only half as much] was located in central cities." 1976 REPORT ON
NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 39. A similar market shift seems apparent in
data for the commercial sector. During the 1970s, suburban employment has grown
much more rapidly than employment in the central cities. This has been particularly
true in manufacturing where larger investments in land are necessary. Id. at 31-33;
IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 218.
126. See Peterson 54-55. The decline in property values may be particularly acute in
cities which are parts of declining metropolitan areas. In such areas, there may be an
excess of housing for the entire area so that property values throughout the metropolitan
housing market begin to decline. Unlike cities in growing metropolitan areas where
sustained suburban growth will help to maintain city housing prices to some extent, the
city in a declining metropolitan area may find little demand for its housing.
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stant, and it increases the incentive for businesses to migrate to communities with more advantageous tax structures.
The situation is aggravated by the highly fragmented tax systems
which are faced by the -taxpayers of most American cities. In order to
avoid the debt and tax limitations which virtually every state has im-

posed on its local governments, 27 most communities have established a
variety of special districts and authorities which have powers to tax and
borrow even though the general purpose government which they overlap
has already met its taxing limitation. 28 In 1972, there were over 8,000
special districts in America's 264 SMSAs. 129 While such units may be
highly effective when they are carefully planned, they can be quite
dysfunctional when established primarily for the purpose. of escaping tax
and debt restrictions. Such fragmentation may create diseconomies of
scale and unnecessary duplication of services. More importantly, a
proliferation of special purpose districts may render traditional tax limits
useless and subject residents to multiple tax burdens which increase
pressure to leave the central city for less service-intensive locales.' 80 In a
127. For a thorough overview of state constitutional and statutory limitations on local
government taxation as of 1971, see U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL REVENUE SYSTEMS AND EDUCATIONAL FINANCE, Ap-

pendix C (rev. ed. 1971).

The problems with these restrictions are detailed in U.S.

ADVISORY

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

COMMISSION

ON

RELATIONS,

STATE

AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
VISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

(1961)

CONSTITUTIONAL

and U.S. AD-

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

(1962). The inadequacies that
were present in the early 1960s are still present today. See, e.g., L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, supra note 111, at 274-78; U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING POWERS

RELATIONS,

STATE-LOCAL REVENUE

SYSTEMS

AND EDUCATIONAL

FINANCE,

supra, Ap-

pendix C at C-1.

The results of one recent study suggest that these limitations have not
been effective in keeping a lid on property taxes. See Shannon, Bell & Fisher, Recent
State Experience with Local Tax and Expenditure Controls, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 276
(1976). Another analyst has suggested that such limitations may have an unintended
dysfunctonal impact on services in regions that need them most. See Pogue, The Effect
of Debt Ltm.ts: Some New Evidence, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 36 (1970).
128. Compare IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 147 with U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

(1961).
129. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL GovERNMENTS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 10, 18 (Table 2) (vol. 5 1975). "SMSA" is an
acronym for the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area(s) within which the Census
Bureau measures the population of major urban centers.
130. The relevant inquiry in insuring fiscal stability is not how much a particular unit
of government can properly borrow or tax but how much a particular tax base can
support. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 58

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 3942 (1961); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE

9 (1962). It
makes little difference whether one unit takes 20 'percent of its citizens' income or four
CONSTITUTI0NAL AND STATUTORY RESTMCTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING PowRS
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city like Chicago, for example, where a property owner is taxed not only
by the city but by a county, a park district, a school district, a forest
preserve, a sanitary district and a myriad of other special purpose
districts,' any decrease in the tax base effected by emigration will
force an increase in the tax rate imposed by each of these overlapping
units of government. In addition, a pattern of consistently higher
property taxes in the central cities may undermine one of the most
3
attractive features of this tax, namely its relatively progressive nature.' 1
B.

Maintainingthe Tax Base

To the extent that urban emigration has involved moves to the
suburbs rather than to other regions of the country, the cities have
traditionally been able to recapture their tax bases through annexation
and consolidation. 133 This capacity to grow and recapture emigrants is
critical to a central city's ability to maintain its fiscal integrity. As a city
grows, it develops facilities which produce benefits not limited to its own
Commercial and entertainment centers, sports facilities,
citizens.'
mass transit systems and facilities for the furtherance of the arts and
sciences all develop to their fullest in the mature urban center. Suburbanites return to -the city each day to work, shop, and conduct business, and again at night and on the weekends for entertainment and
recreation. The city is the center of a complex market; and just as a
merchant must be careful to prevent his customers from leaving his
premises without paying for his wares, the city must develop methods of
forcing its customers-those who labor, visit or pass their leisure
there-to pay for the services provided within its boundaries.
In some cases, it will be very easy for the city to charge suburbanites directly for urban amenities through the imposition of "user
charges." Where the benefits of a particular urban service can be
units take 5 percent each from the same citizens; the burden is the same. Although it is
clearly aggregate burden that is the appropriate focus, no state appears to have adopted
that approach. See Shannon, Bell & Fisher, supra note 127, at 281-83.
131. See IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 146-50.
132. See H. AARON, supra note 112, at 54-55. According to Aaron, the modem view
holds that when property taxes are increasing steadily, the burden of the increases is
bome by the owners of capital and this results in the tax being relatively progressive. If
rates in a locality are not part of a general nationwide pattern of tax increases, however,
then the traditional view holds that much of the burden of the local tax increases can be
shifted to consumers and the tax loses its progressive nature.
133. For a discussion of annexation procedures and the inability of the older cities to
annex new territory, see notes 144-51 infra and accompanying text.
134. This creates what an economist would term an externality. See generally R.
MUSGRAvE & P. MusOiAvE, supra note 91, at 49-80 (theory of social goods).
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limited to a particular group of people, those people can be charged
directly for the service. Museum and swimming pool admission fees,
public parking meters and road tolls are all examples of charges for
these kinds of focused services.135 In general, such service charges have

been applauded by economists because of their equitable allocation of
costs among all actual recipients of benefits. " 6
Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that user charges can play a
major role in the fiscal rejuvenation of the central cities. To begin with,
in many jurisdictions there are important legal impediments to their
imposition. 137 In many states, user charges cannot be imposed because
of a lack of specific authorization or an explicit prohibition. Moreover,
licenses and fees are generally limited to the amounts required to cover
the costs of the particular service or regulatory scheme on which the fee

is imposed.' 38 These requirements keep fees to a minimum and restrict
the ability of the cities to utilize user charges as a mechanism for
recapturing the wealth of its suburban visitors. Given these difficulties,
it is not surprising that the cities' reliance on user charges as a source of
revenue has increased only slightly in recent years.

While almost 13

percent of the revenues raised by cities came from "current charges" in
1957,130 such charges provided barely 18 percent of the local revenues
raised from the cities' own resources in fiscal 1975.140
Ultimately, user charges are simply inappropriate means for financing most urban functions.

The benefits of most city services are not

135. For an interesting discussion of the factors to be considered in imposing charges
for sewer service, water service, parking meters and road use, see LOCAL REVENUE
DIVERSIFICATION 68-76.
136. E.g., id. at 64. It should be noted, however, that such fees may be vulnerable to
severe criticisms from the standpoint of equity. A user fee for museum or park
admission would have a substantially more adverse effect on the ghetto resident than on
his suburban neighbor. School lunch and hospital fee charges are subject to similar
criticisms.
137. Id. at 67. See generally 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 115, § 26.
138. LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION 67; 9 E. McQUmLIN, supra note 115, § 26.15,
at 31. See, e.g., Concrete Contractors' Ass'n v. Village of LaGrange Park, 14 Il. 2d 65,
150 N.E.2d 783 (1958) (implies from village's power to regulate the power to exact a
license fee in order to defray costs of regulation).
139. LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION 7, 12. The United States Bureau of the
Census defines "current charges" as
amounts received from the public for performance of specific services benefiting the person charged and from sales of commodities and services other than
city utilities ....
Current charges are distinguished from license taxes,
which relate to privileges granted by the government or regulatory measures
for the protection of the public. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOvERNMENT FINANCES IN 1964-65, at 75 (1965).
140. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Crw GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1974-75, at 5
(Table 1) (1976).
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easily matched with specific categories of individuals. Anyone who visits
a city receives the benefits of its police, fire and sanitation departments.
Even the benefits of education are not realistically confined to the
students who attend a particular school system. An entire community
may benefit from having its children well educated. Higher education
levels will increase community wealth and benefit all citizens living
therein. Open space and pollution control have similarly broad effects.
As long as a city's boundaries encompass the entire population
that benefits from its services, the inability to impose user charges for
certain core municipal functions does not present a problem. Where
the population that consumes a city's services resides within the city
limits, that population will be subject to the city's property tax and may
vote to control the relationship between the services they want to receive
and the taxes they are willing to pay. 4 ' A problem develops, however,
when an urban area grows beyond the boundaries of its central city and
42
the city can no longer expand to encompass its natural market area.1
When this happens, a city can be thrust into a position of severe
financial strain. The central city must maintain police and fire protection and street and sanitation systems which can accommodate the
millions of people who visit each day but return each night to homes
beyond its traditional tax jurisdiction. A city of 500,000, for example,
might have to maintain services sufficient to accommodate over 1 million
blue- and white-collar laborers who commute to and from its boundaries
every day. 1 43
Historically, the cities have been able to grow with their market
areas through annexation and/or consolidation. 144 For a variety of
reasons, both legal and practical, it now appears that this option is
141. See notes 111-14 supra and accompanying text.
142. An excellent discussion of the importance of reuniting the cities with their

market areas can be found in Peterson 72-84.
143.

There is, of course, some "reverse commuting" where people travel away from

the central cities in the morning and toward them at night. See generally D. NEZER,
ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS: DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 78-80 (1970);
Babcock & Weaver, Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: One More Black Rebuff to the
Latest Liberal Crusade, in TiE URBAN SCENE IN THE SEvENTIEs 208-09 (J. Blumstein &
E. Martin eds. 1974). Unfortunately, this merely exacerbates the problem. The low-

income worker with his minimal tax contribution leaves the city to contribute to a
business whose income and property cannot be taxed by his home city.
144. Annexation involves the expansion of municipal boundaries. Although procedures may differ according to state law, both incorporated and unincorporated territories
may be annexed by most large cities. Consolidation, on the other hand, involves the
merger of one local government with another so that an entirely new entity is created.
See F. SENOcSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 7,

42-44 (1960).
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completely foreclosed for the aging central cities which are currently

experiencing population losses. 145 Given the relationships between
growth and fiscal strength which have already been described, it seems
extremely unlikely that the cities would not annex if they had the power
to do so. In most cases, however, the state statutes that prescribe
annexation procedures' 46 make it extremely difficult for older central
cities to expand through annexation. Unlike some of the newer growing cities of the South and West, most of the older urban centers of

the industrial Northeast are surrounded by a belt of smaller suburban
communities which are also incorporated. In order to protect themselves from absorption by their larger neighbors, the residents of
urban fringe areas have lobbied effectively in many states for statutes

which require concurrent majorities of the voters in both the annexing
city and the area to be annexed in order for one incorporated community to annex the territory of another.14 7 In some states, a municipal
corporation cannot annex territory in another incorporated region under
any circumstances. 4 Similar problems may arise for cities in states
where inhabitants of unincorporated areas may exercise a unilateral veto
over an attempted annexation by a neighboring city.' 49
Clearly, such statutes present a substantial impediment to the cities'

abilities to maintain legal jurisdiction over their market areas. Defen145. See notes 3-21 supra and accompanying text.
146. As a creature of the state, a municipal corporation's power to extend its
boundaries is completely a matter of state law. See 2 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 115,
§ 7.10, at 309. For a particularly strong statement of the states' power over municipal
boundary changes, see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907),
discussed in note 161 infra. The effects of Hunter are discussed in Note, The Right to
Vote in Municipal Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1571, 1571-73 (1975).
147. E.g., VA. CODE §§ 15.1-1032 to -1058 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE §
35.12010 (1976); see ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN
METROPOLITAN AREAS 59 (1962).
In some states, concurrent majorities are required
regardless of whether the area to be annexed is incorporated or not. E.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art., 1182a
(Vernon 1963) (home rule cities only). It should be emphasized that such schemes are
not presently constitutionally required. Cf. Note, supra note 146, at 1573-87 (arguing
that a constitutional right for residents of annexation target areas to vote on annexation
proposals should be established).
For general discussions of the present state of the law with respect to annexation of
incorporated areas, see C. ANTIEAU, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw § 1A, at 19
(1975); 2 E. MCQuiLLAN, supra note 115, § 7.22; F. SENGSTOCX, supra note 144, at 4244.
148. E.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970(7) (Vernon 1963) (does not apply to
home rule cities). Similar results have been reached by judicial decision in states whose
annexation statutes only provide explicitly for annexation of incorporated territory.
See 2. E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 115, § 7.22, at 374-75 and cases cited therein.
149. E.g., 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 115, § 7.37, at 469-70.
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sive incorporation may lead to a proliferation of small municipalities,
which fragments the market area and makes both coordinated economic
development and efficient delivery of urban services impossible. 150 The
general lack of statutory guidelines for review of incorporations'" aggravates the problem by allowing small enclaves of residential communities or manufacturing facilities to incorporate themselves in order to
avoid being encompassed by the high tax jurisdiction of the neighboring
city on which they often depend for their existence.
Even when a state statute allows unilateral annexation of fringe
territories, the existence of these small unidimensional enclaves can
make rational urban development virtually impossible. Though it would
be theoretically pleasing for the central city to impose its taxes on the
members of the suburban communities who use its facilities each day, it
may be fiscally impractical for a central city to annex many of the
residential communities at its fringe, since the single family dwelling
may impose a serious burden on the public fisc. Compared to an
apartment complex or factory, the taxable value of property used for
single family dwellings can be extremely low. Yet the burdens imposed
by such property in terms of water service, road maintenance, and police
and fire protection are substantial because of the spatial dispersion of
single family neighborhoods. At the other extreme, high-density lowcost housing may present comparable burdens as costs connected with
high population densities escalate due to problems associated with
traffic, police protection, and refuse control, and as assessed values fall
because of economies of scale in apartment housing. In many cases the
city simply cannot afford to annex either type of community.
The situation becomes even more onerous when the fringe communities adopt exclusionary zoning ordinances. By restricting an area
to single-family dwellings' 52 or one-acre 1ot,1" or by passing an ordinance forbidding the use of mobile homes 4 in a particular area, fringe
communities often contribute to an inefficient concentration of poor in
the central cities.
150. E.g., Note, An Act to Establish Standards and Procedures for Municipal
Boundary Adjustment, 2 HARv. J. LEGis. 239, 242 (1965).
151. See Mandelker, Municipal Incorporation and Annexation: Recent Legislative
Trends, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (1960).
152. See, for example, the ordinance which the Supreme Court held constitutional in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
153. Such an ordinance was struck down as a matter of state law in Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 45 U.S.L.W. 2379-80 (N.J., Jan. 29, 1977),
afrg 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971).
154. Such an ordinance was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Vickers v.
Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233
(1963).
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As a practical matter, people will locate so as to maximize their
accessibility to other people and activities with whom they need to or
want to have frequent contact.' 55 In recent years there has been a
substantial change in the spatial distribution of urban employment. 156
The development of the shopping center has led increasing numbers
of retailers to leave the cities for the cheaper property and large concentrations of consumers in the suburbs.157 More importantly, there
has been a departure of manufacturing plants from the central cities

of the industrial Northeast. 5 " At the same time, there has been a major
increase in the number of white collar jobs-in banking, finance, the
law, and government-that are available in the central cities.' 59
155. See D. NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIP10 (2d ed. 1974); Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of
the Regional Remedy, 7 URBAN LAW. 262, 271-73 (1975) (presents findings of some
statistical research on this point). Netzer presents an interesting analysis of economic
factors which shape the location decisions of urban residents. D. NETzER, supra at
9-18. For other discussions of factors which shape the spatial structures of urban areas,

TIONS

see INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE CITY:

READINGS ON SPACE AND ENVIRONMENT

(L.

Bourne ed. 1971).
156. See P. PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF AMERICAN CrIEs 51-62 (1976).
157. Between 1963 and 1972, retail sales in the suburbs increased by almost 230 percent. During this same period, the increase in retail sales in the central cities was less
than 160 percent. Little of the growth in retail sales that did occur in central cities
occurred in the central business district. See IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 218 (Tables
XXX and XXXI)(1976).
158. See P. PORTER, supra note 156, at 51-56; 1976 REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH

AND DEVELOPMENT 31-32 (in many of the declining central cities, manufacturing employment has actually declined, Table 11-8); IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 218 (Table
XXXII) (1976).
Currently, there is a serious debate concerning the extent to which this loss in
manufacturing employment is due to emigration to the suburbs or to other areas of the
country. On one hand, it has been suggested that lower tax rates, the presence of large
labor supplies, and the availability of cheaper open space in the South and Southeast
have attracted increasing numbers of major businesses away from the central cities of the
industrial Northeast. E.g., JEC PRINT 13; T. MULLER, supra note 25, at 6-8; P. PORTER,
supra, at 55. Also see notes 224-27 infra and accompanying text. However, the most
recent evidence indicates that actual "migration" of firms has played only a minor role in
the changing employment situations of the northern industrial tier and the sunbelt. See
note 227 infra.
159. See P. PORTER, supra note 156, at 54. According to Paul Porter, New York
is illustrative of the trend: between 1960 and 1970, when New York's population rose by
1.5 percent, the number of manufacturing jobs fell from 947,000 to 773,000--down 18
percent in a time of rising prosperity. Id. But these losses were more than offset. Jobs
in the financial sector increased by 90,000 and the city job sector showed a job increase
of about 145,000. Id. at 51, 54. This increase in local public sector jobs is characteristic of central cities throughout the country. Peterson 112; see JEC PRINT 23. See also
Jusenius & Ledebur, A Myth in the Making: The Southern Economic Challenge and the
Northern Economic Decline 41 (prepublication copy prepared for Economic Development Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1976) (suggesting that the growth project-
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While one would expect some population shifts to occur, thereby
bringing laborers closer to their respective places of work, exclusionary
zoning schemes make this movement impossible. Frequently, the industrial laborer who lives in Detroit or Cleveland cannot afford to move
to follow his job. Where he can afford to move, he may be precluded
from finding housing within his price range because of zoning restrictions on lot sizes, multiple-family dwellings or trailer parks.
The inability of the blue collar worker to leave the city to live closer
to his job also limits the inclination of the white collar worker to move
back into the central city to live closer to his. Until the poor can find a
way out of the inner city, city dollars will have to be devoted to urban
renewal and low-income housing rather than to those amenities which
might be attractive to the white collar worker. 6 '
In recent years, a number of state courts and legislatures have
begun to recognize the serious problems that can be caused by restrictive
annexation and zoning schemes and have begun to fashion solutions
through judicial and legislative decisions.' 6 ' Most states now allow
ed in the next decade for the service, finance, insurance and real estate industries may be
crucial to the continuing growth of employment opportunities in the industrial Northeast).
160. The financial burden on the cities is further aggravated by two other phenomena. First, the movement of a manufacturer may cause additional unemployment (with
all the costs which that entails) in the central cities if inner city residents who cannot
afford to move cannot afford to commute either. See 1976 REPORT FOR NATIONAL
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 33. Second, the inability of the poor to move the city
boundaries outward may contribute to an increase in the city's population density, and
the costs of many urban services are thought to increase with increased density. See A.
OTr & J. Yoo, NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAN THE TREND BE REVERSED? 27-

28 (1975).
161. It is important to emphasize the inability of the federal judiciary to deal with
these problems. As the Supreme Court explained at the turn of the century in Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907):
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State

as may be entrusted to them.. . . The number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they

shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State . . . . The
State . . . at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, . . . [or]

expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.

All this

may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of
the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitu-

tion, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.

Hunter involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute which provided for the union of
contiguous municipalities. See id. at 161-64. The case has frequently been cited for the
proposition that states may set up any annexation procedure they wish without according
any voice to citizens of the area targeted for annexation and without fear of federal
intervention. See Murphy v. Kansas City, Mo., 347 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Mo.
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1972) (annexation election open only to voters in annexing area); Detroit Edison Co. v.
East China Twsp. School Dist., 247 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Mich. 1965), af 'd, 378 F.2d 225
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967) (annexing school district acted only by vote
of board of election, while residents of the annexed area approved by referendum); Note,
supra note 146, at 1571-72 & n.9, citing Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of
Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967) (annexation by
action of annexer's governing board); cf. People ex rel. Landwer v. Village of N.
Barrington, 94 I1. App. 2d 265, 237 N.E.2d 350 (1968) (statute which requires notice of
impending annexation to be published in a newspaper does not violate the fourteenth
amendment by failing to require personal notice).
The Supreme Court has also been reluctant to reject local zoning ordinances on any
but the most flagrant grounds. The standard of review for zoning cases was set forth
fifty years ago in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in which
the Court was faced with a claim that a zoning ordinance which prohibited a landowner
who had been holding vacant land for industrial development from doing so was an
unconstitutional taking of liberty and property without due process. The Court rejected
this claim, holding that the zoning ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the states'
police powers. See id. at 386-88. According to the Court, the legislative judgment that
a particular zoning classification was necessary to protect the public welfare would have
to be upheld as long as the judgment was "fairly debatable." Id. at 388. The general
exclusion of all industrial establishments from residential districts was validated as a
"reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement" of the ordinance. Id. See also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding an urban improvement project against
a challenge of taking without just compensation). According to the Court, the concept
of public welfare is broad and covers values that are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. Id. at 33.
The Court has taken a similarly strong position against equal protection challenges
to zoning ordinances. In the recent case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), the Court upheld a local ordinance which restricted land use to single-family
dwellings with the word "family" defined to mean one or more persons related by blood,
adoption, or marriage or not more than two unrelated persons living together as a single
household. Rejecting the argument of six unrelated college students who had rented an
apartment, the Court held that the ordinance did not violate equal protection as long as
it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective (the Court pointed to the
avoidance of traffic and congestion, id. at 5) and did not impinge on any fundamental
right. Id. at 4-8.
More recently, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Supreme Court placed
what may be an insurmountable obstacle in the path of most constitutional attacks on
exclusionary zoning provisions. In Warth, three plaintiffs-a non-profit corporation
devoted to fostering housing for low-income groups in the Rochester area, several
Rochester taxpayers, and several Rochester residents with low incomes who were also
members of minority groups-sought to challenge a zoning ordinance of a suburb of
Rochester on the ground that it excluded people of low and moderate income. The
Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of the action on the ground that none of the plaintiffs
had standing to challenge the ordinance. According to the Court, a plaintiff who seeks
to challenge exclusionary zoning practices on constitutional grounds must allege that
such practices harm him and that he would benefit personally and tangibly from the
court's intervention. Id. at 508. Clearly neither the Rochester taxpayers nor the nonprofit corporation could meet this standard. Id. at 508-14. The Court refused to grant
standing to the low-income plaintiffs because none of them had shown that they would
have been able to purchase suitable housing in the suburb at an affordable price in the
absence of the zoning ordinance. Id at 502-07. There was no evidence that appropriate
housing would have been built in the absence of the zoning ordinance-in other words,
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municipalities to initiate annexation procedures by ordinance 0 2 so that
costly and time-consuming petition and election procedures can be
avoided. Many of the states also prohibit unincorporated fringe areas

from exercising a unilateral veto. 6 3 Such prohibitions prevent residents
of fringe communities from standing in the way of rational urban
development merely in order to avoid inclusion in the tax base of any
municipality.'

The most significant recent development in the area of boundary
adjustments has been the increased use of local government boundary

commissions. Since 1964, the United States Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (A.C.I.R.) has recommended that the state
legislatures establish local government boundary commissions to:

(1) approve new municipal corporations;
(2) dissolve or consolidate non-functional local governments;

(3) limit the creation of new special districts:
(4) consolidate or dissolve special districts;
(5) oversee municipal annexations; and
that the plaintiffs' inability to locate in the suburb was not the consequence of the
economics of the area housing market but of the zoning ordinance. Id. at 506.
After Warth, it seems clear that a plaintiff will not be able to obtain standing to
challenge a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds unless he can show that a
particular housing development which could meet his housing needs at a price he could
afford was not built because of the challenged ordinance. It seems likely that this standard will be met only in the most flagrant situations where a city has either explicitly
changed its zoning law to stifle a project which would have directly benefited a plaintiff, see United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971),
or possibly, where a city had refused a variance for a proposed project, see Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), discussed in note 190 infra. (For a comprehensive treatment of Warth and other recent developments in the law of standing, see
Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Price-Anderson Act: Ripeness and Standing
Before the Holocaust, 1976 DUKE L.J. 967, 972-85.)
Given the fundamental importance of land use decisions as a state and local governmental function, it seems likely that the tenth amendment will impede any congressional use of the commerce clause to require regional zoning programs. Cf. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed in notes 81-89 supra and
accompanying text.
162. IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 167.
163. Id.
164. It should be noted, however, that most states will not permit a fringe area to be
annexed merely to enhance the tax base of the annexing city. See Woodroof, Systems
and Standardsof MunicipalAnnexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 GEo. L.J.
743, 752 (1970). Many states also place special restrictions on the annexation of
farmland, see id. at 750-51, to protect farmers from high property taxes that may make
agricultural land uses financially infeasible.
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(6) develop spheres of municipal influence. 165
Commissions with some or all of the powers suggested by the
A.C.I.R. have been established in at least eight states. 1

6

Statewide

67

commissions are currently in operation in Alaska,
Iowa, 68 Michi0
1
170
171
gan,
Minnesota
and New Mexico.
California, Oregon and
72
Washington have established boundary commissions at the local level.
While the power of these commissions is generally limited by statutory
standards or criteria included in their enabling legislation 7 a and by other
statutory provisions which require voter approval of certain boundary
adjustments, 74 these restrictions have not affected the major purposes
of the A.C.I.R. recommendations. The statutory standards are quite
broad and leave the commissions with substantial discretion. 175 While
requirements of voter approval do prevent the commissions from implementing central city expansions on their own motion, 76 they do not
inhibit their ability to impede defensive incorporations, annexations, or
special purpose district consolidations, since commission approval must
generally be obtained for all such actions.
The primary advantage of these boundary commissions, particularly those at the state level, is that they help to depoliticize the boundary
165. IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 167-68. The A.C.I.R. has also recommended that.
these commissions concern themselves with county and other sub-state district boundaries. Id. For a useful legal analysis of the operation of such commissions, see
Woodroof, supra note 164, at 745-46, 753-64.
166. Specifics of these commissions' powers and their relative strengths and weaknesses are discussed in IMPROVING URBAN AMEIICA 168-70; Woodroof, supra note 164, at
753-64. Citations to specific statutory authorizations for the commissions are set forth
in notes 167-72 ilra.
167. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.19.250, .260 (1976), § 29.68.010 (1972).
168. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 368.9 et seq. (1976).
169. MIcH. COMP. L. ANN. §§ 123.1001 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 414.01 et seq. (Supp. 1977). Established in 1959,
Minnesota's municipal commission was the first statewide boundary commission established in this country. A useful discussion of its operation can be found in Note, The
Minnesota Municipal Commission-State-Wide Administrative Review of Municipal
Annexations and Incorporations,50 MINN. L. REV. 911 (1966).
171. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-7-11 et seq. (1976).
172. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 54790 et seq. (West Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 199 (Replacement Part 1975); WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 36.93 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
173. Woodroof, supra note 164, at 753-62; e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54796 (West
Supp. 1976); MIcH. COMP. L. ANN. § 123.1009 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 414.031(4) (Supp. 1977); WALsm REV. CODE § 36.13.173 (Supp. 1976).
174. E.g., MicH. COMP. L. ANN. § 123.1010 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. §
199.480 (Replacement Part 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.93.150(2) (Supp. 1976).
175. See Woodroof, supra note 164, at 753-62. Specific examples may be found in
the provisions cited in note 173 supra.
176. In some instances the commissions are authorized to initiate boundary changes
or consolidations of special purpose districts on their own motion. E.g., ORE. Rtv. STAT.
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adjustment process by focusing attention on rational urban development
rather than on the vested interests of the competing governmental units

and their residents.

Their utility is manifest from the experiences of

the various states in which they are presently in operation.

Where the

commissions have the discretion to modify incorporation and annexation
proposals, 177 new incorporations appear to have been slowed and central
cities have been allowed to expand more rationally.'7

Defensive incor-

porations have been dramatically reduced, and it appears that a number
of proposals that were not in the interest of the region were either
withdrawn or not even submitted when faced with the prospect of
commission rejection.1 79

Where they have the authority, the commis-

sions have also been successful in reducing the growth and actual
numbers of special purpose districts within their jurisdictions. 8 0
More recently, some of the state courts have begun to take action to

insure that urban growth will not be impeded by exclusionary zoning in
fringe communities.' 8" Most zoning ordinances derive their force from
the state's police power-the power to protect the public health, safety,

morals or general welfare.' 2 To the extent that this is true, a zoning
ordinance can be valid only if it yields a positive benefit to the state as a
§ 199.485 (Replacement Part 1975). In Oregon, the local commissions may actually
initiate and execute certain minor changes without any voter or governmental approval.
Id. § 199.487.
177. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 414.02(3) (Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. § 199.461

(Replacement Part 1975).
New Mexico's commission is the noticeable exception in this regard. Under N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-7-15 (1976), the state municipal boundary commission is authorized
only to determine whether certain statutory prerequisites have been met. When these
conditions are met, the commission must order annexation. If the conditions are not
satisfied, the petition must be denied. See Woodroof, supra note 164, at 762-63.
178. See IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA 170. In Minnesota, for example, the "commission's first decade of experience showed a drastically reduced rate of new mufiicipal
corporations and a doubling of their average size." Id.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. E.g., Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(1971); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). See also Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div.
1971), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 2379-80 (N.J., Jan. 29, 1977); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
182. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926);
Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 15-16, 283 A.2d 353, 355-56 (Law Div.
1971); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 657-59, 202 S.E.2d 889,
892-93 (1974).
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whole. Where a zoning scheme is beneficial only to the locality which
enacts it but is detrimental to the general welfare of the state and its
citizenry, the ordinance will be contrary to its enabling legislation and

cannot be upheld. 8 ' The importance of scrutinizing zoning ordinances
from a statewide perspective was forcefully expressed in the landmark
case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 84 where the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a developing

municipality could not use its zoning system to make it physicially or
economically impossible to provide low- and moderate-income housing
in the municipality for those who need and want it.'85 According to the
183. See, e.g., Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 218-19, 192
N.W.2d 322, 328 (1971); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175, 179, 336 A.2d 713, 725, 727-28, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110-11, 341 N.E.2d 236, 24243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681-82 (1975). Some of the cases scrutinizing exclusionary
zoning have also relied on state law notions of due process and equal protection. See,
e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, supra, at 175,
179, 336 A.2d at 725, 727-28. However, in this context, the notions of substantive due
process, equal protection and the general welfare appear to be inextricably intertwined
and little reference is made to the traditional rational basis tests usually employed in due
process and equal protection analysis. See Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision:
Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 ILL. LF. 1, 3-5.
184. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
185. 67 N.J. at 174, 179, 336 A.2d at 724, 727. The following extended excerpt from
the Mt. Laurel opinion provides valuable insight into the concerns which underlay the
court's rejection of the Township's sweeping use of its zoning powers:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason for this course of conduct [exclusionary zoning] has been to keep down local taxes on property ....
This policy of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from New Jersey's tax structure, which has imposed on local real estate most of the cost of
municipal and county government . . . . Sizeable industrial and commercial
ratables are eagerly sought and homes and the lots on which they are situated
are required to be large enough, through minimum lot sizes and minimum
floor areas, to have substantial value in order to produce greater tax revenues
to meet school costs ...
Almost every [municipality] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial
interest and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or
entities not adding favorably to the tax base. . . . One incongruous result is
the picture of developing municipalities rendering it impossible for lower paid
employees of industries they have eagerly sought and welcomed with open arms
. . . to live in the community where they work.
The other end of the spectrum should also be mentioned. . . . Core
cities were originally the location of most commerce and industry. Many of
those facilities furnished employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled. These
employees lived relatively near their work, so sections of cities always have
housed the majority of people of low and moderate income, generally in old
and deteriorating housing. Despite the municipally confined tax structure,
commercial and industrial ratables generally used to supply enough revenue
to provide and maintain municipal services equal or superior to those furnished in most suburban and rural cases.
The situation has become exactly the opposite since the end of World
War II. Much industry and retail business, and even the professions, have
left the cities. . . . The economically better situated city residents helped
fill up the miles of sprawling new housing developments. . . . In a society
which came to depend more and more on expensive individual motor vehicle
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court, the general welfare requires each developing municipality to
regulate its land use in a manner which permits residential development

for a "fair share" of its region's low- and moderate-income housing
needs."' Similar decisions have been handed down in Michigan, New

York and Pennsylvania without the explicit restriction to developing
municipalities. 18 7 At the very least, these decisions require each municipality to consider the needs of the larger metropolitan area of which it is
a part in planning its own development."8 8

Decisions like Mt. Laurel also point out the need for legislative
establishment of effective regional planning commissions. The courts
appear to recognize that they do not have the expertise to continue to
deal with the complexities of regional development and have only
reluctantly taken on this responsibility with respect to zoning to protect
what they properly perceive to be the interests of the state.'8

9

Such

decisions may help to force the legislatures to provide for more effective
regional planning. This, in turn, could help to maintain the tax base
in the still growing cities of the South and to mitigate the strains on
the older cities of the industrial Northeast. 90
transportation for all purposes, low income employees very frequently could
not afford the permissible housing near such locations. These people have
great difficulty in obtaining work and have been forced to remain in housing
which is overcrowded, and has become more and more substandard and less
and less tax productive. There has been a consequent critical erosion of the
city tax base and inability to provide the amount and quality of those governmental services-education, health, police, fire, housing and the like-so necessary to the very existence of safe and decent city life. Id. at 170-73, 336
A.2d at 723-24, as excerpted in Peterson 82.
186. 67 N.J. at 174, 188, 336 A.2d 724, 732. An excellent discussion of Mt. Laurel
and the concepts of "developing community" and "fair share" can be found in Ackerman, supra note 183.
187. See cases cited in note 181 supra. It seems likely that a balancing test will be
employed to apply Mt. Laurel to developing municipalities in New Jersey as well. See
Ackerman, supra note 183, at 15-24.
188. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 108-09, 341 N.E.2d
236, 241-42, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679-80 (1975).
189. See, e.g., id. at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241-42, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80.
190. The practical effects of Mt. Laurel and its progeny may be limited in older
established suburban communities whose development is complete, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent refusal to impose an obligation on established suburban communities to
vary their zoning systems in order to accommodate low- and moderate-income housing.
In Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit held that absent a compelling interest, Arlington Heights
could not refuse to rezone a piece of property where a variance was the only impediment
to the construction of a low- and moderate-income housing development which would
help to mitigate a history of racial discrimination in the Chicago metropolitan area.
According to the circuit court, to permit the village to refuse the variance would be to
allow it to continue to ignore its part in creating a metropolitan housing market which
had historically discriminated against blacks and other racial minorities and thus to
deprive these minority groups of equal protection of the law. Id. at 414-15. The
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Tax Diversification

A second alternative available to a city which is unable to expand
by physical growth is to expand its tax base through diversification. As
different taxes are borne by different segments of an urban economy,
diversification may recapture suburban wealth for the central city in
varying degrees.'' Unlike the property tax which can only be levied on
property within the jurisdiction, payroll taxes, sales taxes and user
charges can all be used to obtain revenue from individuals and businesses residing outside the city limits. By taxing income or sales at their
points of origin, the central cities can recapture part of the wealth which
would otherwise be taken to the suburbs.
Over the past twenty years, local governments, particularly the
larger cities, have continuously moved toward more diversified revenue
systems.' 92 In order to cope with the fiscal problems caused by the
decline in their property tax bases, many cities have begun to rely on
sources other than the property tax for their local revenues. In 1952,
over 60 percent of the municipal taxes collected from local sources
were collected through the property tax. 193 By 1975, only 42 percent
of the cities' local revenues were derived from property taxation. 94
During the same period, there has been a growth in city dependence on the income tax and the sales tax. Since the authorization of the
first local sales tax in New York City in 1934, over 1,245 municipalities
in twenty-six states have been permitted to levy a sales tax.' 95 Particularly in the growing cities of the South and Southwest where there has
not yet been any rapid movement of retail shops to beyond the city
lines, 9' the local sales tax often plays a highly significant role in city tax
structures.19 7 Of the nation's forty-eight largest cities, more than half,
Supreme Court, while agreeing that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, held that such
official action would constitute an equal protection violation only if intent or purpose to
discriminate were shown. The Court found no such intent on the part of Arlington
Heights. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct.
555 (1977).
191. See generally LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
supra note 91, chs. 15-20; Stocker, Diversification of the Local Revenue System: Income and Sales Taxes, User Charges,FederalGrants, 29 NAT'L TAx J. 312 (1976).
192. U.S. ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note
42, at 3; see id. at 36-38.
193. See id. at 37 (Table XV).
194. See id. (estimate).
195. Id. at 31.
196. See generally Stocker, supra note 191, at 318-19.
197. At least five southern and western cities presently receive over 35 percent of
their local revenues from a local sales tax: Denver (41 percent), New Orleans (41.3
percent), Oklahoma City (37.8 percent), Phoenix (39.1 percent) and Tulsa (55 per-

ent).

LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICA'TON 34.
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twenty-six, were collecting a sales tax as of 1972.10s Several states have
also authorized local income taxes in recent years. 9 Of the nation's
forty-eight largest cities, at least thirteen presently levy an income tax,20 0
and in nearly half of these the local income tax plays a dominant role in
the local tax system." 1
While data on the commuter contribution to these taxes is not
readily available, it does appear that local sales taxes and income taxes
(that include non-residents) 2 02 can help to recapture substantial
amounts of the suburban tax base for the central cities. In a 1971
survey of fourteen local governments, more than one-third indicated that
over 25 percent of their income tax collections came from non-residents.20 3 A recent study which estimated the prospective effects of
various tax packages on the Atlanta metropolitan area concluded that
larger portions of the tax burden could be shifted to persons outside of
Atlanta through a payroll tax or general sales tax than through a
property tax.20 4
Despite the potential advantages of a shift from the property tax, it
should be emphasized that city sales and income taxes are still relatively
rare. With the exception of a few states where one of these taxes has
been given a keystone role in the local tax structure, the dependence on
these taxes as a source of local revenues is still quite low. In 1971,
income taxes accounted for only 6.8 percent of all local city revenues,
20 5
and the general sales tax contributed less than 8 percent.
The major reason for the general lack of reliance on local sales and
income taxes appears to be fear on the part of states that such measures
will disrupt the state economy and cut into state revenues. Local officials also fear that a local sales or income tax will drive consumers and
businesses to non-tax or lower-tax communities, leaving little added
198. Id.
199. Alabama, Delaware, Indiana (counties), Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Id. at 52-53.
200. Id. at 53-54.
201. Cincinnati (57.7 percent), Cleveland (47.8 percent), Columbus (78.2 percent),
Louisville (55.6 percent), Philadelphia (62.6 percent), Toledo (74.9 percent). Id. at
54 (Table IV-2).
202. With the exception of Washington, D.C., every major city with a local income
tax includes income of non-residents. Id. at 53.
203. Derived from id. (Table IV-3).
204. L. SCHROEDER & D. SioQUIsT, THE PROPERTY TAX AND ALTERNATIVE LOCAL
TAXES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYsIs ch. 3 (1975). Schroeder and Sjoquist estimated that
47.8 percent of a property tax would be exported outside of Atlanta while 67.6 percent
of a payroll tax and 50.3 percent of a general sales tax could be exported. Id. at 94-95.
205. LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFCTIOCN 12.
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revenue through the new tax and depressing the tax base at the same
time.
With respect to the sales tax, the empirical evidence is somewhat
equivocal.20 As a general proposition, it seems well established that
when imposition of a sales tax results in local tax differentials, a loss of
sales revenue will result. 20 7 These losses of sales may also be aggravated if they cause businesses to relocate in low tax jurisdictions in order to
maximize profits. The extent to which sales revenues will decline,
however, depends on a variety of factors. Certain fashion items such as
women's clothes or jewelry, for example, may be only minimally affected by a sales tax.208 People may feel that such items can only be
bought in the fashion center of a central city; there may be no market
for the goods outside the high tax jurisdiction; or it may simply be that
those who purchase the item are insensitive to the tax differential. A
similar indifference is often noted with respect to low-price items or
necessities such as groceries, for which consumers are reluctant to leave
their neighborhoods.20 One study in Colorado actually concluded that,
although a temporary loss in sales occurred just after a new sales tax was
imposed in Denver, the market eventually returned to its pre-tax sales
level.2 10
From a local point of view, much of the "border problem" can be
alleviated if all jurisdictions in a particular state can and do impose a
particular tax. In a state like Illinois, for example, local sales taxes have
only a minimal effect on intrastate location and purchasing decisions
since all of the state's 100 counties and 1,245 municipalities impose the
tax.21 ' Interstate effects are also negligible since in many cases consumers are too far from state borders to bother to make the journey.
The absence of major interjurisdictional tax differences also reduces adverse effects from local income taxes. 212 In general, local
206. See id. at 39-40.
207. The leading study in the area is Mikesell, Central Cities and Sales Tax Rate
Differentials: The Border City Problem, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 206 (1970). See also LOCAL
REVENUE DIVERSIFICAION 39-40; Hamovitch, Sales Taxation: An Analysis of the
Effects of Rate Increases in Two Contrasting Cases, 19 NAT'L TAX J. 411 (1966);
McAllister, The Border Tax Problem in Washington, 14 NAT'L TAX J. 362 (1961).
208. Cf. McAllister, supra note 207, at 368.
209. See id.
210. See LOCAL REvENuE DIVERSIFICATION 39.
211. See id. at 32, 38. California and Washington also appear to have near-universal
sales tax coverage. Id. at 38. The absence of any major sales tax differential was the
most frequent reason advanced for the lack of location effects in a recent study in which
173 out of 178 municipal finance officers opined that their local general sales tax had
not resulted in a loss of business for their communities. Id. at 38-39.
212. See id. at 58-59 (reporting results of a Municipal Finance Officers Association/
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income tax rates are relatively low, and this has minimized incentives to
relocate.213 More importantly, since the burden of income taxes is
almost completely on the taxpayer,214 the tax will rarely affect location
decisions when it is imposed at the place of work rather than at the place
of residence. Unless corporate tax or personal tax considerations in a
close corporation or small partnership cause his employer to move, an
individual may be unable to avoid the tax without finding a new job.
Businesses themselves will be unlikely to undertake a costly move in
order to secure a small tax advantage for their employees. If, on the
other hand, the tax was imposed at the place of residence, individuals
might avoid it by changing residences without forsaking their jobs.
The one criticism to which local sales and income taxes are clearly
vulnerable is that they often make rich jurisdictions richer with much
less substantial returns for poorer communities. 215 This difficulty can
only be overcome by state-imposed equalization or revenue-sharing
programs.
D. FederalAid

Federal aid is an increasingly significant factor in local government
finance. During the last decade, such aid increased at an average yearly
rate of 15 percent, whereas the rate had been less than 10 percent in the
previous ten years. 216 By 1975, state and local governments obtained
30 percent of their revenue from federal aid, more than double the
percentage contribution of federal funds in the 1950s. 217 For declining
major cities external aid has been particularly important, with combined
state and federal aid making up from about one-half to two-thirds of the
growth in revenues over this period.218 As a result, aid to state and
local government has gone from 10 percent of federal outlays in 1966 to
17 percent in 1976. Given the continuation of the policies contained in
current law alone, federal aid is expected to increase another 30 percent
by 1981.219 This rapid increase in federal aid during the last decade has
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations survey in which forty-eight
out of fifty-four city managers indicated that the imposition of an income tax by their
jurisdiction had not resulted in losses of population or business firms). See generally
R. SMITH, LOCAL INCOME TAXEs: EcoNoMIc EFFECTS AND EQuITy (1972).
213. R. SMITH, supra note 212, at 9, quoted in LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION 58.
214. See J. BRfTrAIN, THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (1972); R. MUSORAVE
& P. MUsGRAVE, supra note 91, at 403-14.
215. See LOCAL REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION 40-44, 59.
216. See Peterson 59 (Table 9).
217. Sunley, supra note 9, at 382.
218.

Peterson 59-60 (Table 10).

219. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET

OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FY

1977, at 246
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been accompanied by a shift from narrowly restricted special purpose
categorical grants to more general purpose block grants whose funds are

distributed according to formulas based on local community characteristics. Whereas block grants did not even exist a decade ago, by 1975

they made up almost 25 percent of the federal aid package with more
than half of this being in the form of general revenue sharing.22 This
percentage is currently being further increased, at least temporarily, by
emergency anti-recession aid in the form of funds for public employ221
ment and temporary fiscal aid for state and local governments.

While there is general approval of this trend toward greater reliance on general purpose block grants and broad agreement on the need

for emergency anti-recessionary aid, some fundamental disagreements
have arisen over the way these funds are allocated. Since major portions of the basic authorizing legislation for these programs will expire
in fiscal year 1977, this issue will have to be addressed in the first
222
session of the 95th Congress.
Much of the dissatisfaction with the current pattern of federal
expenditures is concentrated in the northern industrial states and their

major metropolitan areas.223 The factors which are most often cited are
the higher unemployment rates in the North during the recession,224 the
imbalance between the federal taxes which the northern states pay and
the federal expenditures that are returned to the region,22 and the rapid
(1976). However, projections also suggest that such aid will fall to only 14 percent of
federal outlays in 1981. Id. at 248. If state and local aid is to retain its current share
of outlays, it will therefore have to grow at an even faster rate.
220. Id. at 248, 253-54.
221. The public employment funds are authorized under the recently modified Title
VI of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 961 et
seq. (Supp. 1976), and the countercyclical revenue sharing funds are authorized under
Title II of the new Public Works Employment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 6721 et seq. (Supp. 1977).
222. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, and Title H (Antirecession Provisions) of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1976 all expire in FY 1977. See 29 U.S.C.A. §
802(a) (Supp. 1976), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5303(a)(Supp. 1976), and 42 U.S.C.A. §
6722(b)(Supp. 1977) respectively.
223. See, e.g., The Future of the Northeast, 2 EMPIRE STATE REPORT 332-33, 343-45
(1976); Havemann, Stanfield & Peirce, supra note 11; Jusenius & Ledebur, supra note
159, at 1; Leone, The Fiscal Decline of Older Cities: Causes and Cures, 29 NAT'L TAx
J. 257 (1976) (Mr. Leone is the New Jersey State Treasurer); Special Report: The
Second War Between the States, BUSINESS WEEK, May 17, 1976, at 92.
224. In 1975, the North had an unemployment rate of 9.9 percent, compared to 8.3
percent in the South. However, this difference almost disappears if one does not count
the northern Virginia suburbs near Washington and the energy-rich states of Texas and
Oklahoma. Jusenius & Ledebur, supra note 159, at 29.
225. In the North, the average federal tax collection was $1,561 per person in 1975
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manufacturing employment 2-2 ' in the

South relative to the North.
Since the programs through which changes in the pattern of federal
expenditures could most easily be made are those involving grants to
state and local governments, 228 a great deal of attention has been
focused on allocation formulas. However, it is in the grant area that the

northern states enjoy their only advantage in federal expenditure patterns,
presumably due to their success in applying for the early
categorical programs.

This advantage has been at least partly perpetu-

ated in the block grant programs by various "hold harmless" provisions
designed to prevent any precipitous decline in aid when old categorical
programs are combined in a new block grant. This is an issue of
particular concern to the northern states in the reauthorization of the

Community Development Block Grant Program. According to the
original legislation, the Program's "hold harmless" provisions are scheduled to be phased out by 1981.230 The northern metropolitan areas,
which are generally the ones with the most to lose, wish to retain the
"hold harmless" feature or to introduce another factor into the formula,

such as the age of the local housing stock, which would have roughly the
same effect.2 31
whereas federal expenditures averaged only $1,260 per person. In the South, on the
other hand, taxes were $1,188 while expenditures were $1,356. While the South did
receive more than the North in federal expenditures per capita in 1975, both regions
received less than the national average federal expenditure of $1,412 per person. Id. at
44.
226. From 1960 to 1975, real personal income in the Southeast grew 114.3 percent
compared to only 65.5 percent in New England, 57.8 percent in the Mid-Atlantic states
and 65.1 percent in the Great Lakes region. However, per capita income in these
Northern states has remained fairly constant at between 105 percent and 120 percent of
the national average since World War II. While per capita income in the South has
steadily closed the gap, it is still only 80 percent of the national average. The Future of
the Northeast, supra note 223, at 342-43.
227. Manufacturing employment in the Northern states declined by 12.7 percent
from 1970 to 1975, reflecting the nationwide decline in this type of industry and the
heavy reliance of the Northeast on it. Largely because of this decline, overall employment in the North grew by only 1.3 percent over the same period; employment in the
South grew by 16.7 percent, mainly because of the substantial growth of jobs in state
and local government (up 23.5 percent) and the service industries (up to 30.8 percent).
However, few of the Northern job losses were due to firms migrating to the South.
Between 1969 and 1973, the percentage of employment losses due to migration of firms
from the North was only 1.5 percent. Jusenius & Ledebur, supra note 159, at 34, 40.
228. It is much more difficult to change the flow of funds in defense spending and
Social Security, for example.
229. Haveman et. al found that the Northeast received $260 per capita in federal
grants to state and local governments in 1975 while the South received only $220 per
capita. Haveman, Stanfield & Peirce, supra note 11, at 880.
230. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5306(g)(Supp. 1976).
231. BNA HousING AND DEv. REP. 283 (1976).
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Action on this proposal or on a number of others currently being
advanced -32 would continue or expand the dominance of the northern
states in obtaining grants to state and local governments. The impact
of such changes would largely be felt in the areas of government services
and assistance to low-income individuals. It would appear to be inappropriate to divert such federal funds from other regions that still have
the greatest poverty and the lowest income in our nation in order to
redress a regional imbalance in other federal expenditures.
Proposals to modify the distribution of emergency anti-recession
funds are another matter. The two anti-recession programs, public
service jobs and countercyclical state and local fiscal aid, are aimed at
getting money into consumers' hands quickly and at helping local
governments avoid the cut-backs that would tend to make the recession
worse. Proposals to direct these temporary funds to the areas where the
recession has hit the hardest, particularly in the industrial Northeast, are
therefore more appropriate.233
IV.

FINANCING

As cities have sought to remedy their increasing imbalance of
revenues and expenditures, the role of debt financing in their financial
structures has also changed. In recent years, an increased need for
capital from tight money markets has resulted in important changes in
the cities' use of both long- and short-term debt financing and in the
structure of the capital markets in which this debt is obtained.
A.

Long-Term Debt

The use of long-term debt (i.e., debt with a maturity longer than
one year) has a relatively stable history. In the late 1950s and through
the 1960s, proceeds from the sale of bonds and other long-term debt
instruments consistently contributed roughly 50 percent of the funds
needed for state and local capital expenditures.23 4 In the 1970s, this
232. See, e.g., RECOMMENDATIONS OF FEDERAL GRANTS FORMULAS PANEL TO COALITION OF NORTHEASTERN GOVERNORS (1976).

233. The Coalition of Northeast Governors has recommended a two-tier unemployment trigger (4%k percent and 6% percent) for the distribution of countercyclical reve-

nue sharing funds in order to target more of the funds to high unemployment localities.
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 232, at 4.
234. Fortune, Financing PL 92-500:

The Impact of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act of 1972 on the Municipal Bond Market, in DATA RESOURCES, INC., WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT OF 1972: ECONOMIC IMPACTS, STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES
EXPENDITURES 18 (Appendix B) (National Technical Information Service, No. PB 250-

018 1975).
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proportion has been somewhat higher, averaging around 60 percent.
However, while the use of long-term debt in capital financing has been
fairly steady over long periods, it has also been highly volatile in the
short run due to fluctuations in interest rates and in the availability of
capital. For all United States municipalities, for example, the ratio of
debt financing to capital expenditures varied from 66 percent to 54
percent and back to 68 percent over the three fiscal years 1969, 1970
and 1971.235 In fiscal 1975, the proportion of capital expenditures
financed through indebtedness again dropped precipitously to only 47
2 -30
percent, a decrease of 33 percent from the previous fiscal year.
Among local governments, the heaviest reliance on debt financing
has been in the cities, and the larger the city the greater the reliance has
been. In fiscal 1974, the twenty-nine cities with populations above
500,000 had a ratio of debt to capital expenditures of 82 percent
compared to only 61 percent for all other cities. While the higher
dependence on debt in larger cities appears to persist over time, cities of
all sizes have experienced great volatility in their dependence on longterm debt. In fiscal 1975, large cities depended on indebtedness for
only 52 percent of their capital expenditures while smaller cities had
reduced their ratio of debt to capital expenditures to 45 percent.23 7
This volatility in debt financing has its origins in the basic structure
of the market for municipal debt. Because the interest on most municipal bonds is tax-exempt, 23 8 these bonds are most attractive to those
individuals and institutions who are subject to high tax rates. In the
past, this has meant that the market relied primarily on wealthy individuals and commercial banks for its capital supply. More recently, the
market has expanded slightly to include increasing numbers of fire and
casualty insurance companies. 23' However, the number of investors
who find tax-exempt municipal bonds attractive is clearly limited. Most
individuals cannot afford to exchange the higher interest rates of the
private sector for the tax exemption on municipal bonds, and many of the
large institutional investors such as pension plans and charitable organizations are currently exempted from federal income taxes and therefore
235.

See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1969-70, at

5-6 (Table 1) (1971); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN
1973-74, at 7-8 (Table 1) (1975).
236. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1974-75, at
5-6 (Table 1) (1976).
237. Id. at 7 (Table 3).
238. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a).
239. See

U.S.

ADVISORY

COMMISSION

ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 17-18 (1976).

RELATIONS,
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have no incentive at all to purchase municipals. As a result of this tight
capital supply, municipal bond markets are extremely sensitive fo any
changes in either the supply or demand for capital. On the one hand,
in periods where state and local governmental demand for capital is up,
the limited supply of capital may cause interest rates to rise precipitous-

ly. 240 On the other hand, any constriction of the money supply in the
overall capital market would directly affect the participation of commercial banks in the market for long-term municipal debt. As they are the
largest source of funds for municipal debt financing, any departure of
the commercial banks would make municipal indebtedness hard to sell
and would drive up interest rates. Both of these factors have contributed to recent increases in interest rates on municipal bonds. 2 4 '
TABLE 4
City Debt Financing FY-1969 to FY-1975
FY-69

Long-Term Debt
Issued as a Percentage of Capi66
tal Expenditures
Short-Term Debt
Outstanding as a
Percentage of Total
9.3
Debt Outstanding
Debt
Short-Term
as a Percentage of
47
Total Debt Issues
Percentage Increase
in Capital
14
Expenditure
Yields of Twenty-Year
Medium Grade
4.97
Municipal Bonds
SOURCES:

FY-70

FY-71

FY-72

FY-73

FY-74

FY-75

54

68

76

67

69

47

11.2

13.9

12.7

12.1

12.7

14.5

56

56

51

52

53

62

10.1

10.4

6.71

6.03

5.0

5.50

11.5

5.23

7.9
5.44

21.8
6.71

Derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES
for selected years, 1968-69 through 1974-75, Table 1 (the items used are
Capital Outlay, Gross Debt Outstanding, Short-Term, Long-Term Debt
Issued); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
UNDERSTANDING

THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL DEBT,

Exhibit A-4,

at 36-38 (1976).
240. Some of the recent increases in municipal interest rates may be due to increases
in the amount of debt financing undertaken by the states. Prior to 1965, debt financing
supplied funds for only 36 percent of state capital expenditures while local governments
drew closer to 70 percent from debt financing. See Fortune, supra note 234, at 182
(Table 1.6). In fiscal 1975, both state and local governments relied on long-term debt
for almost 50 percent of their capital expenditures. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSTUS,
GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1974-75, Tables 9 (capital expenditures) and 14 (longterm debt issue) (1976).
241. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 239, at 36-38 (Exhibit A-4). See
Table 4 supra.
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The reaction of the cities to these periods of limited funds and high
interest rates has been to finance larger portions of capital expenditures
from short-term debt. This trend is illustrated by the data presented in
Table 4. The taxable bond option has often been proposed as the
solution to this problem.2 42 Under this proposal, state and local governments would be free to offer taxable bonds. In order to compete with
the corporate bond market, those bonds would have to be sold at higher
interest rates, which would appeal to investors who cannot currently
take advantage of a tax exemption and which would thus broaden the
supply of debt funds. In order to mitigate the costs of those higher
interest rates, the federal government would provide a subsidy to the
local government approximately equal to the difference between the
interest rates on taxable and tax-exempt bonds so that the local governments would have the same interest cost regardless of whether they
chose to market taxable or tax-free debt.
This approach to broadening the market for municipal debt has
two particularly appealing features: it would save money for the public
sector and reduce tax exemption benefits to the wealthiest municipal
bondholders. Under the exemption, much of the federal subsidy goes
to the wealthiest purchasers of tax-exempt bonds2 43 and the city receives
interest cost savings in the municipal bond markets that are only a
fraction of lost federal income tax revenues. A taxable bond with a
direct federal subsidy would insure that the municipalities actually receive
all of the benefit while eliminating special tax benefits to the wealthy.
Perhaps more importantly, the taxable bond would also result in an
overall savings to the public sector, since the increased federal revenues
from taxation of bond interest are expected to exceed the direct federal
subsidy necessary to offset the increased interest costs to state and local
governments. It has been estimated that the tax exemption on municipal bond interest costs the federal government about $1.50 in foregone
242. E.g., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO TAX
EXEMPT STATE AND LOCAL BONDS (1973); J. PETERSEN, CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE
MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, 52-64 (Comm. Print 1976)
(prepared for Joint Economic Comm. of Congress, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.); Sunley,
supra note 9, at 395-400. For a useful analysis of the economics of the taxable bond
alternative, see Fortune, supra note 234, at 122-24, 139-48.
Several proposals to adopt the taxable bond option have been introduced in
Congress, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra; versions of the Tax Reform Acts
of 1969, 1973, and 1976 each included proposals for taxable municipal bonds. See, e.g.,
H. 1039, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. 2142, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1439,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. 967, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 512, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); H. 2702, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

243. See, e.g., J. PETERSEN, supra note 242, at 58-60.
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income tax revenues in order to reduce state and local interest costs by
$1.00.244 With a direct subsidy, this inefficiency would be eliminated.
In 1975, this device could have saved the federal government $1.4
billion.2 41 Finally, in addition to lower costs, the taxable bond should
help to stabilize the municipal bond market by expanding the supply
of available capital.
Use of a taxable bond option should not be impeded by constitutional considerations. While there was some concern in the early tax
cases over whether or not the Constitution would allow taxation of
interest on municipal bonds,240 most commentators would now agree
that this is not a problem. 47 Such a tax would not be imposed on
governments, but on citizens, and its impact would be no different from
that of taxing any other revenue which a private individual derives from
a governmental employer or contract.248 Since there is no direct interference with state or local governments' freedom to conduct their own
affairs, but rather an addition to the list of available options, National
League of Cities v. Usery would not dictate a different result. 249
B.

Short-Term Debt

Short-term debt (i.e., debt which matures in one year or less)
currently serves two major functions in municipal finance: shortterm loans may be used to smooth out revenue flows in anticipation
of tax payments or intergovernmental grants that are due but have not
yet been received, and they may be used to provide flexibility so that
cities can take advantage of fluctuating market conditions in the timing
of their long-term debt offerings. The principal instrument used to
smooth out seasonal variations in the inflow of revenues is the revenue
anticipation note, which is issued to raise funds in advance of actual
collection of taxes. The principal instrument used to create flexibility
244. Sunley, supra note 9, at 396; see R. GOODE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 136 (rev.
ed. 1976). See also J. PETERSEN, supra note 242, at 55-58; Comparison of the Interest
Cost Saving and Revenue Loss on Tax-Exempt Securities, ch. 20 in STAFF OF SUBCOMM.
ON ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF CONGRESS, 89TH CONG., 2D
SESS., STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS AND FINANCING: PUBLIC FACILITY
FINANCING 327-33 (Comm. Print 1966); Fortune, supra note 234, at 129-31; 138-47.

245. Sunley, supra note 9, at 396; see J. PETERSEN, supra note 242, at 55-58.
246. E.g., Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86 (1895).
247. See, e.g., Kirby, State and Local Bond Interest, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86th CONG., 1st SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM pt. 1, at 679, 682 (1959).
248. It is well established, for example, that salaries of state and local government
employees may be taxed by the federal government. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
249. See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
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in the timing of long-term bond offerings is the bond anticipation note.
This device enables funds to be raised to meet capital expenditure requirements in a timely manner while allowing the long-term debt offering to be temporarily delayed until interest rates fall.
Beginning with the late 1960s, the, volume of short-term debt
incurred by state and local governments has increased markedly. Between 1968 and 1970 short-term debt doubled; by 1971, it had tripled.2 50 In 1970, the volume of short-term borrowing by state and
local governments actually exceeded long-term borrowing for the first
time 2 5 1 Even so, the reliance on short-term debt by these governments
was still relatively modest in comparison to the total amount of debt
outstanding. Short-term debt still constituted only 8.9 percent of outstanding state and local indebtedness in fiscal 1975. 252
Within the state and local sector, the cities, particularly the large
cities, have always relied more heavily on short-term debt, and the
municipalities were vigorous participants in the rapid expansion of
short-term debt use between 1969 and 1974.253 In fiscal 1969, shortterm debt accounted for slightly less than half of the total indebtedness
incurred by the cities. During the early 1970s, this proportion increased slightly and remained fairly steady at about 54 percent of debt
issued. In fiscal 1975, fully 62 percent of all debt issued by the cities
was short-term as the cities sought to fund a big surge in capital
expenditures which occurred in that year." 4
The pattern which emerges from the data in Table 4 is indicative of
some of the basic forces at work in the market for municipal debt. In
periods during which capital expenditures increase substantially (fiscal
1970 and 1975), demand for long-term debt will also increase. This
increase in demand will lead to higher interest rates. In order to
minimize their interest costs, the cities will then turn to short-term
financing in the hope that interest rates will decline. This shift in
financing emphasis will yield lower proportions of long-term debt relative to capital expenditures and heavier use of short-term debt as a
proportion of debt issued.
The pressure for cities to shift to short-term debt appears to have
been particularly intense in the larger cities. Even as early as fiscal
250. See U.S.

ADVISORY COMMISSION

note 239, at 35 (Exhibit A-3).

See also J.

ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PETERSEN,

RELATIONS,

251. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 239, at 35 (Exhibit A-3).
252. Derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES
75, at 26 (Table 14) (1976).
253. See Table 4 supra.

254. Id.

supra

supra note 242, at 2, 4-10.
IN

1974-
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1969, the twenty-nine largest U.S. cities used short-term financing for
more than half of the total debt which they issued. By fiscal 1975, a
year of heavy short-term debt use by all governments, short-term debt
constituted almost three-quarters of the debt issued by these large
2 5
cities. 1
This new heavy reliance on short-term debt by large cities was
brought into dramatic focus by the recent financial crisis in New York
City.' 56 In 1975, New York City faced debt service obligations 2 7
which amounted to approximately 40 percent of total outlays of funds.
This amount of debt service was exceptionally high relative to other
cities and even relative to previous years in New York itself.2 5 8 The
reason this tremendous level of debt payments was generally thought to
be manageable was because so much of it (80 percent) was short-term
debt that could be "rolled over," i.e., covered by new short-term borrowing. The crisis was precipitated by the unexpected inability of New
York to "roll over" its short-term debt.
The default of the Urban Development Corporation (a quasi-state
agency) on $104.5 million in short-term notes made underwriters nervous and prompted them to withdraw from an issue of New York City
tax anticipation notes. When the City later attempted another issue of
short-term notes, it was able to sell only about 40 percent of the issue.
Finally, when $792 million in short-term obligations came due in June
1975, New York found that it could not borrow the funds to cover the
payments. At that point the Municipal Assistance Corporation was
established; this action was followed in short order by creation of the
Emergency Financial Control Board and by federal financial assistance.
The New York crisis has its parallel in corporate finance. In
1970, the failure of the Penn Central and its default on large amounts of
commercial paper shook investor confidence and made it virtually impossible for some other corporations to roll over their own commercial
paper as it matured. During the summer of 1970, several major corporations watched their cash drain away as they paid off mature obligations and were unable to find new lenders in sufficient numbers. In
255. In fiscal 1968, for cities with more than 500,000 population, 54.6 percent of all
debt issued was short-term. By fiscal 1975, this percentage was up to 73.8 percent.
Derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1968-69
(1970) and U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Crry GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1974-75

(1976).
256. For a description of the New York City crisis, see Shalala & Bellamy, A State
Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119.

257. "Debt service" includes both interest payments and repayment of debt principal.
258. In 1965, for example, these obligations had amounted to only about 25 percent
of total obligations in New York.
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order to make short-term bank credit available to these businesses, the
Federal Reserve took steps to increase the liquidity of commercial
banks."' Since that experience, investors in commercial paper have
looked much more closely at the financial condition of borrowing
corporations.
Both the New York situation and its counterparts in corporate
finance involved a heavy reliance on particular forms of short-term debt,
a liquidity crunch caused by a sudden loss of investor confidence, closer
investor scrutiny of the financial data supplied by the borrowing community, assistance from the federal government, and a move to more
cautious lending policies and fuller disclosure by borrowers. More
careful examination of municipal issues by investors and underwriters
should help to prevent the recurrence of these circumstances in the
municipal bond market in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

This review of the financial problems facing our largest cities
makes it clear that the central responsibility for maintaining the fiscal
integrity of America's major urban centers cannot be left solely with the
cities themselves. While careful management and urban planning can
help some of the younger cities to maintain their current positions of
financial strength, many of the older urban centers are already experiencing serious financial difficulties and have only a limited capacity to
control expenditures or to expand their revenue resources. Although
expenditure growth can be controlled in certain areas (for example, by
restructuring municipal employee pension plans), there is little that the
cities can do to offset the costs of inflation or of the additional services
required by their citizens. Even the younger cities which are still
growing have only limited powers to expand their boundaries or to
diversify their revenue systems in an effort to recapture their revenue
bases as central city residents and businesses relocate in the suburbs or
in other regions.
The federal government is also unlikely to make any major contribution to the solution of the large cities' financial problems. After a
decade of expansion, the growth of federal aid as a proportion of city
revenues now appears to be reaching its natural limits, at least for many
of the more hard-pressed big cities which have been among the most
aggressive seekers of federal funds. Even with continued expansion of
259. See 1970 FED.

RESERVE

BULL. 605; BUSINESS

WEEK,

June 27, 1970, at 40.
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federal grant programs, the increasing emphasis on formula-based aid
programs will tend to spread the funds broadly across many communities so that program increases are unlikely to be a major source of funds
for the older cities. Temporary countercyclical aid should help to
ameliorate the financial strain on cities during periods of greatest stress,
and implementation of such proposals as the taxable bond option can do
much to broaden and stabilize the market for municipal debt and to
improve the efficiency of the subsidy already inherent in the tax exemption. However, neither of these programs, nor the many other federal
actions that have been proposed, has the capacity to shift the cities from
positions of fiscal strain to positions of fiscal strength. The cities simply
cannot rely on the federal government to continue to provide funds to
support the higher and higher levels of municipal expenditures which
they are increasingly unable to fund from their own revenue sources.
Primary responsibility for reducing the strain on city finances must
be borne by the states. The capacity of the central cities to extend their
boundaries through annexation or to extend their revenue bases through
sales or income taxation is almost totally dependent on state authorization. Only the states can provide the growing cities with the flexibility
they need to continue to expand with their market areas, and thereby
avoid those obstacles to the growth of their taxing jurisdictions that have
contributed to the fiscal difficulties currently faced by the older central
cities.
Several options are also available at the state level for mitigating
the strain on older cities which are no longer growing. Regional forms
of government or regional or state assumption of particular services may
be used to reunite the cities with their natural market areas. To the
extent that proposals for regionalization or state assumption of services
can be implemented with a minimum of new administrative costs, and in
such a way that the central cities already in financial difficulty are not
forced to assume the additional expense of revenue contributions for use
in other hard-pressed communities, such alternatives should be carefully
260
considered.
Where political or economic considerations make regional or state
assumption of services or the costs of those services infeasible, the states
260. See generally R. BAHL & W. VOGT, FISCAL CENTRALIZATION AND TAX BURDENS:
STATE AND REGIONAL FINANCING OF CITY SERVICES (1975); Bahl & Puryear, Regional
Tax Base Sharing: Possibilitiesand Implications, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 328 (1976); Special
Symposium, State and Regional Government Financing of City Government Services:
Tax Burdens and Budgetary Implications, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 53 (1976); Stephens, The
Metropolitan Impact of Fiscal and Governmental Reforms: A Simple Model of the
Metropolis, 7 URBAN LAw 495 (1975).
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should consider regional or statewide revenue sharing as a vehicle for
relieving fiscal strain in the central cities. Particularly in growing
metropolitan areas where migration is from the cities to the suburbs
rather than out of the metropolitan area as a whole, regional sharing of
any continued growth in the metropolitan tax base may help to mitigate
revenue losses by the central city. Under Minnesota's Metropolitan
Revenue Distribution Act, for example, each of the seven counties in the
Twin Cities Area is required to contribute 40 percent of any increase in
revenues from taxes on commercial and industrial property to an areawide pool from which tax receipts will then be redistributed among
municipalities in the area according to their populations and per capita
valuations of taxable property.26 ' While there has been some criticism
of this program because of its focus on changes in the commercial/industrial, rather than the more substantial residential tax base, - 2 the
thrust of the plan is both innovative and properly focused. Through the
redirection of new metropolitan area revenue resources back toward the
central cities, the cities may be enabled to continue to provide services
that are used by the entire metropolitan area. Where the entire metropolitan area is declining, statewide revenue sharing, power equalization
programs or assumption of services at the state level may be the only
alternatives available to bolster the financial picture of the declining
region.
Whatever course of action is ultimately selected, it seems clear that
the states must assume a more active role in maintaining the financial
strength of America's cities. The recent period of increasing federal
responsibility for financing the cities has come to a close, and the
problems of financing municipal services can rno longer be left to local
officials. A new era of vigorous state action is now required.
261. MINN. STAT. ANN., §§ 473.01-.13 (Supp. 1977); see Village of Burnsville v.
Onischuk, 301 Minn. 137, 222 N.W.2d 523, appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1974)
(rejecting challenge to the act based on state constitutional provision requiring that taxes
be uniform upon the same class of subjects).
262. See Peterson 81.

